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THREE ESSAYS ON ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN MONETARY
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University of Pittsburgh, 2007
Adaptive learning is important in dynamic models since it is a process that shows the im-
provement in the understanding of the agents of the model. Whenever there is a dynamic
environment, there is a room for improvement through learning. In this thesis I analyze the
adaptive learning of the agents in di¤erent setups. In my rst paper I show that adaptive
learning does not eliminate the multiplicity of stationary equilibria in the Diamond overlap-
ping generations model with money and productive capital; both dynamically e¢ cient and
ine¢ cient equilibria are found to be stable under adaptive learning. In my second paper I
show that the two agents of a natural-rate model, with di¤erent beliefs, learn the economy
which leads to convergence or endogenous uctuations of the ination rate under di¤erent
conditions. And in my last paper I show that a central bank with an extraneous instrument,
"cheap talk" announcements, can inuence the private sector to achieve better outcomes
than could be obtained by manipulating the nominal interest rate alone with full knowledge
of private sector expectation formation and in anything less than full knowledge, the private
sector learns to discount announcements.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.0 LEARNING AND DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 The case with capital and no money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 Adaptive Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2.1 How do agents learn? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2.2 Numerical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 The Case with Capital and Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 The existence of dynamically ine¢ cient equilibrium in Diamonds over-
lapping generations model: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.3 Expectational Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 A More General Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.0 TWO-SIDED LEARNING IN A NATURAL RATE MODEL . . . . . . 22
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
iv
3.3 Learning Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4 Learning with the Same Belief Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4.1 Misspecied Central Bank Policy Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4.2 A Committed Central Bank Learning the Economy with the Fully Spec-
ied Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4.3 A Non-Committed Central Bank Learning the Economy with the Fully
Specied Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5 Two-sided Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.1 A Robustness Check for Endogenous Fluctuations . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.2 Reverse Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5.3 Exploiting the Di¤erence in Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.7 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.7.1 Proof of Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.0 THE CENTRAL BANKSINFLUENCE ON PUBLIC EXPECTATION 54
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2.1 Optimal Policy Under Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.2 Optimal Policy Under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.3 Stages of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.1 Expectational Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.1.1 Stability Under Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3.1.2 Stability Under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.4 Determination of the Announcement, it+1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4.1 Ad-hoc Announcement Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
v
4.4.2 Optimized Announcement Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4.2.1 Full Information Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4.2.2 Announcement with Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4.2.3 Announcement with Incomplete Information, Two-Sided Learn-
ing Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.6 Steady States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.6.1 Steady States of the Discretion Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.6.2 The Steady State Under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.6.3 Determination of the Announcement Under Commitment . . . . . . . 75
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.0 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Illustration of Phase Diagram for the Planar Model with Capital and Money 13
2 Nash Equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3 Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Nash Equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5 Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6 Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7 Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8 Ination rate and output gap with an ad-hoc announcement rule, it+1 = 2+0:9ut 66
9 Ination rate and output level with optimized announcement . . . . . . . . . 68
10 The ination rate and output gap when the CB has credibility concerns . . . 70
11 The ination rate and the output gap when there is 2-sided learning . . . . . 71
vii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is in three parts. In the rst part we examine the question of the stability of
equilibria under adaptive learning in Diamonds (1965) overlapping-generations model with
productive capital and money. In particular, we are interested in whether dynamically in-
e¢ cient equilibria, which are possible in this model, are stable under adaptive learning.
This model has one more asset, capital, than the model considered by Lucas (1986), Marcet
and Sargent (1989) and others. Lucas (1986) showed that if agents used a simple adaptive
learning rule, they would converge upon the unique monetary equilibrium of a two-period
pure exchange OLG model with money as the single outside asset. We show that adaptive
learning does not eliminate the multiplicity of stationary equilibria in the Diamond overlap-
ping generations model with money and productive capital; both dynamically e¢ cient and
ine¢ cient equilibria are found to be stable under adaptive learning.
In the second part we start with a model of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002). They
consider a natural rate model in which the central bank has imperfect control over ination
and is uncertain of the actual laws of motion of the economy. They show that if the central
bank uses a misspecied approximating model to determine ination there can be endoge-
nous cycling (escape dynamics) between the time-consistent Nash equilibrium outcome and
the optimal Ramsey outcome of Kydland and Prescott (1977). They obtain these escape
dynamics assuming the central bank and the private sector have the same information and
beliefs about the economy. In this paper we assume these two actors have di¤erent beliefs
about the structure of the economy. The central bank and the private sector learn the econ-
omy with their own models separately. If the private sector learns the economy with a fully
specied model instead of having rational expectations, escapes disappear and the economy
converges to the Nash outcome. With a reverse robustness check we nd that escapes can
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reappear if the private sector uses a misspecied model and the central bank uses a fully
specied model. Thus escapes can arise in a model where the central bank is better informed
than the private sector. Moreover under certain conditions the di¤erence in beliefs in a two-
sided learning model allows the central bank to exploit the expectations of the private sector
to achieve an ination rate lower than the Nash equilibrium outcome level of ination.
In the last part, using a New Keynesian model, we show that a central bank with an
extraneous instrument, "cheap talk" announcements, can inuence the private sector to
achieve better outcomes than could be obtained by manipulating the nominal interest rate
alone. Announcements are e¤ective only if the central bank has full knowledge of how private
sector expectations are formed, in which case the central bank can achieve lower ination
and higher output. Otherwise the private sector learns to discount announcements, and we
observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium levels of ination and output.
2
2.0 LEARNING AND DYNAMIC INEFFICIENCY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Lucas (1986) suggested that adaptive learning might be useful as an equilibrium selection
device in a simple, two period overlapping generations model with money as the single outside
asset. He showed that if agents used a simple adaptive learning rule á la Bray (1982), they
would converge upon the unique monetary equilibrium of the model. Marcet and Sargent
(1989) extended this nding to an environment where a long-lived government nanced
a xed decit by printing money (seigniorage) and where agents learned according to a
recursive least squares learning process. The environment they consider gives rise to a La¤er
curve and the possibility of two stationary monetary equilibria. They show that the low
ination stationary equilibria is stable and the high ination equilibrium is unstable under
the recursive least squares updating scheme. This work has been interpreted as supporting
the notion that low ination, monetary equilibria are attractors under adaptive learning
processes in overlapping generations models which are known to admit multiple equilibria.
More recently, Lettau and Van Zandt (2001) and Adam et al. (2006) have shown in the
seigniorage ination overlapping generations monetary model that the high ination steady
state (Lettau and Van Zandt (2001)) or stationary paths near that steady state (Adam
et al. (2006)) may be stable under adaptive learning dynamics under certain restrictive
timing assumptions, e.g., if agents have contemporary observations of endogenous variables
in the information sets they use to form future expectations. These ndings cast some doubt
on Lucass suggestion that adaptive learning dynamics might provide a means of selecting
between the low and high ination stationary equilibria of the model as it appears that under
certain conditions both equilibria might be learnable. On the other hand, as Marcet and
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Sargent (1989) pointed out, the high ination steady state of the seigniorage model has the
counterfactual implication that an increase in the money growth rate is associated with a
reduction in the steady state ination rate.
In all of this prior work involving the stability of monetary equilibria in overlapping
generations economies, the models examined leave out alternative means of intertemporal
savings, in particular, productive capital. It is of interest to reconsider whether monetary
equilibria remain stable under adaptive learning processes when capital is also present, and
that is the aim of this paper.
An overlapping generations model with both capital and government liabilities was rst
proposed by Diamond (1965). Here we consider the stability of the equilibria in the Diamond
model under adaptive learning behavior by agents. The version of the Diamond model we
consider has at money in place of government debt (as in Diamonds original formulation)
as the sole outside asset so to maintain comparability with the prior literature on learning. It
is well known (see, e.g. Azariadis (1993)) that this model admits three stationary equilibria:
an autarkic equilibrium, a nontrivial nonmonetary equilibrium where capital is the only
source of savings  the inside money equilibrium  and an outside money equilibrium
where at money and productive capital coexist and pay the same rate of return. The latter
equilibrium is only possible if the inside money equilibrium is dynamically ine¢ cient. Under
the benchmark assumption of perfect foresight, the autarkic equilibrium is a source, the
inside money equilibrium is a sinkand the outside money equilibrium is a saddle. It may
seem implausible that a perfect foresight steady state equilibrium with the saddle property
can be learned by adaptive agents. However, Packalén (2000) Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
have shown that the perfect foresight saddle path of the RamseyCass-Koopmans optimal
growth model is indeed locally learnable under standard assumptions about preferences and
technology and so it is not so implausible to consider whether individuals are capable of
learning such equilibria. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) have shown that the inside money
equilibria of a scalarDiamond model one without any outside asset  is learnable by
adaptive agents, but the question of whether the outside money equilibrium of the Diamond
model is learnable has not, to our knowledge, been previously addressed.
This question is important for several reasons. First, the Diamond model with an outside
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asset is a standard workhorse model in monetary theory. If the monetary equilibrium of this
model is unlearnable, it would call into question a large body of work in monetary theory
that makes use of this equilibrium. Second, as noted earlier, an implication of prior work in
the learning literature is that monetary equilibria are learnable, nonmonetary equilibria are
not learnable and hyperinationary equilibria may be learnable under certain conditions. It
is important to examine whether this conclusion is robust to the inclusion of an additional
asset by which individuals can save intertemporally, namely capital. Third, this model has
an equilibrium that is dynamically ine¢ cient the nontrivial equilibrium without outside
money. In this equilibrium, the capital stock is too high; all agents can be made better
o¤ by lowering the capital stock to the golden rule level. It is of independent interest to
know whether such dynamically ine¢ cient equilibria are learnable or not; if not then the
possibility of dynamic ine¢ ciency, which is typically illustrated using the Diamond model,
may be taken less seriously. Finally, this work adds to the learning literature by considering
learning in another multivariate system which di¤ers from the RamseyCassKoopmans
framework examined by Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we consider the case where
capital is the only means of storage between periods. In Section 3, capital and money both
can be used as means of storage. In case Section 4 a more general case where consumption
is possible in both of the periods of the model. The last section, Section 5, is the conclusion.
2.2 THE CASE WITH CAPITAL AND NO MONEY
2.2.1 The model
Consider a two-period, overlapping generations environment in discrete time. Following
the learning literatures examination of such an environment, we assume that there is no
technical progress or labor supply growth. At every date t = 1; 2; ::: a single representative
agent is born. This agent works when young and consumes only when old. Each young agent
inelastically supplies his unit labor endowment in exchange for the competitive market wage,
wt.
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The young agent must decide how much to save in the form of capital. Savings at time
t equal next periods capital stock. Output, Y of the single, perishable consumption good
is produced using capital and labor according to a Cobb-Douglas production technology
Y = KL1 , where K is the aggregate capital stock, L is aggregate labor input, and
 2 (0; 1) is capitals share of output. We will work with the intensive version of the
production technology where output per capita is y = f(k) = k, and k denotes capital
per worker. Under perfect competition, factors are paid their marginal products, so that net
return on capital is rt = f 0(kt)  and the wage paid per unit of labor is wt = f(kt) ktf 0(kt).
The representative agent born at time t seeks to maximize:
max
fct+1;ntg
U(ct+1; nt) = u (ct+1)  v (nt)
subject to:
kt+1  ntwt
ct+1  Ret+1kt+1
Utility from consumption c, u(), is assumed to be concave and to satisfy the Inada
conditions. Agents experience disutility from working which is captured by assuming that
v() is a convex function. In this paper we use the functional forms, u(c) = c1 
1  and
v(n) = n
1+"
1+
which satisfy all of these properties. The young agents intertemporal decision is
whether to work less today or to consume more tomorrow. Let nt denote labor demand. In
equilibrium labor demand equals labor supply, nt = Lt. We also use Ret+1 to denote expected
return gross return on investment in capital.
The maximization problem can be stated as:
max
nt
Et

u(Ret+1ntwt)
	  v(nt)
The rst order conditions give
u0(Rt+1ntwt)Ret+1(wt + nt
@wt
@nt
) = v0(nt)
Using the functional forms u(c) = c
1 
1  and v(n) =
n1+"
1+
we can rewrite the rst order
condition as
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nt = (1  ) 1+" (Ret+1)
1 
+"w
1 
+"
t
Using the market clearing condition, kt+1 = ntwt, together with the fact that factors are
paid their marginal products, wt = (1  )kt , we arrive at a single equation characterizing
equilibrium dynamics in the model without money:
kt+1 = (1  )
2+"
+"
 
Ret+1
 1 
+" k
 1+"
+"
t (2.1)
Notice that one equilibrium is the trivial steady state equilibrium where kt+1 = kt = 0
for all t. The other non-trivial interior steady state equilibrium can be found using the the
denition of Ret+1 in 2.1 and solving the the following nonlinear equation:
k
in
= (1  ) 1+" ((kin) 1 + 1  ) 1 +" [(1  )(kin)] 1+"+"
We label this steady state capital stock kin as it corresponds to the interior steady state
for the capital to labor ratio in the model without outside money. Note that in the special
case of full depreciation,  = 1, we can get an explicit expression for k
in
:
k
in
=

(1  )2+"1  11 2+ "+"
In order to study stability under adaptive learning dynamics, we will need to linearize
(2.1) with respect toRet+1 and kt, around the steady states under consideration. Linearization
gives:
kt+1 = c
in + inr r
e
t+1 + 
in
k kt; (2.2)
where
cin = (1  ) 2+"+" ((kin) 1 + 1  ) 1 +" (kin) 1+"+" ;
inr = (1  )
2+"
+"
1  
 + "
((k
in
) 1 + 1  ) 1 +" 1(kin) 1+"+" ;
ink = (1  )
2+"
+"
1 + "
 + "
((k
in
) 1 + 1  ) 1 +" (kin) 1+"+" 1:
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Since factors are paid their marginal product, rt+1 = k 1t+1  . Linearizing this equation
around the steady state gives:
rt+1 = d
inkt+1; (2.3)
where
din =  (  1) (kin) 2:
2.2.2 Adaptive Learning
We focus on the case of the interior rational expectations steady state where k = kin as the
trivial case is not of economic interest. We now relax the assumption that agents possess
rational expectations and assume as in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, section 4.5) that agents
form not-necessariliy rational expectations about the value of ret+1 in the linearized system
(2.2). Their expectations, together with the value of the capital stock will determine the
value of next periods capital stock.
2.2.2.1 How do agents learn? We suppose that agents form forecasts of the value of
rt+1 by applying a least squares regression to past data. By contrast, Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) used a simpler, deterministic decreasing gain gradient learning rule in their analysis.
Agentsforecasts interact with the actual law of motion (2.3) to determine a new capital
stock kt+1 each period. Thus, a new observation is added to the historical data set each
period and agents use this to update the coe¢ cients of their forecasting model.
We suppose that agents forecast rt+1 using the perceived law of motion:
rt+1 = at + btkt + t: (2.4)
where  is a white noise term. This rule may be rationalized as follows: Equation (2.3)
combined with (2.3) imply that rt+1 = a+ bkt + cret+1. So the rational expectations solution
will be of the form given by the perceived law of motion (2.4). Hence, this forecast model
nests the rational expectations solution as a special case and there is some hope agents can
learn the REE. If the coe¢ cients at and bt converge to the rational expectations solution,
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then we say that the rational expectations solution is learnable, or stable under adaptive
learning; otherwise we say it is unstable or unlearnable.
For analytical results we rely on the criterion of expectational instability, as developed
in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Consider a class of perceived laws of motion, specied by
a nite dimensional parameter  = (a; b). Suppose that agents use a given perceived law
of motion to formulate their forecasts of variables of interest. Inserting these forecast rules
into the structural equations dening the true economic model we can obtain the actual
law of motion implied by the perceived law of motion. If the actual law of motion lies in
the same space as the perceived law of motion, though with possibly di¤erent parameters,
then we obtain a mapping T () from the perceived to the actual laws of motion. Rational
expectations solutions  correspond to xed points of T (). A given rational expectations
solution  is said to be E-stable if the di¤erential equation
d
d
= T ()  
is locally asymptotically stable at . Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001) show how satisfaction of this condition will under certain regularity conditions
characterize the stability of the dynamics of the stochastic recursive least squares learning
algorithm.
Using the perceived law of motion, the expected value of rt+1 will be a + bkt. Pugging
this value into the linearized equation (2.2) gives the actual law of motion (ALM) for capital:
kt+1 = c
in + inr a+
 
ink + 
in
r b

kt: (2.5)
Combining (2.5) with (2.3) gives the actual law of motion for interest rates:
rt+1 = d
in(cin + inr a) + d
in
 
ink + 
in
r b

kt (2.6)
The mapping from agentsPLM (2.4) to the ALM (2.6) is given by the T-map:
T
0@ a
b
1A =
0@ din(cin + inr a)
din(ink + 
in
r b)
1A
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The unique rational expectations equilibrium for this model is the unique xed point of
the T-map which is:
d
d
0@ a
b
1A = T
0@ a
b
1A 
0@ a
b
1A
where  denotes notional time. It is said that the rational expectations equilibrium is
expectationally stable, or E-stable, if the rational expectations equilibrium is locally asymp-
totically stable under the above equation.
da
d
= dincin +
 
dininr   1

a
db
d
= dinink +
 
dininr   1

b
The rational expectations equilibrium is E-stable if and only if dininr < 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that  2 (0; 1),  = 1 and  > 1. Then dininr < 1 and the
unique non-trivial steady state of the economy where capital investment is the only means of
intertemporal savings is expectationally stable.
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the appendix.
2.2.2.2 Numerical Analysis Assuming less than full depreciation we need to use nu-
merical methods, as in that case, it is not possible to nd a closed form solution for the
steady state value of capital, k
in
. Nevertheless, we can show that in all instances examined,
the interior steady state exists and is unique.
Specically, we conducted a simulation exercise where we change all model parameters
within an empirically plausible range. Table 1 gives the parameter ranges we used. For each
parameter value we used a step-size of 0:001
For all parameter values given in Table 1 the value of dininr is less than 1 which pro-
vides numerical conrmation that the nonmonetary equilibrium is learnable for empirically
plausible cases.
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Parameter Lower Bound Upper Bound
 0.1 0.8
 0.1 0.5
 1.001 3.001
" 1.001 3.001
Table 1: Parameter Values for the Non-Monetary Model
2.3 THE CASE WITH CAPITAL AND MONEY
2.3.1 The Model
Consider next, the same model, but now allow money as another mean of intertemporal
savings. The growth rate of money is assumed to be exogenously set and equal to , i.e.,
mt = (1 + )mt 1
This implies endogenous determination of real government consumption, gt =

(1+)
mt per
period. As our focus is on monetary equilibria and less on scal policy, we assume that
government consumption leaves the economy.
Agents can now choose to hold their savings in both money and capital. The possibility
of arbitrage requires that return on capital and return on money are same. We will assume
this condition throughout the learning process. Savings can be thought of as mutual fund
investing in two assets which yields a unique rate of return for investors. The Ret+1 in the
model represents this return. The equality of returns on money and capital will be used in
nding the steady states of the economy.
maxU(ct+1; nt) = u (ct+1)  v (nt)
subject to:
mt + kt+1  ntwt
ct+1  Ret+1(mt + kt+1)
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Simplifying the budget constraints gives ct+1  Ret+1ntwt. The maximization problem thus
becomes:
Etu(R
e
t+1ntwt)  v(nt)
The rst order conditions give:
u0(Ret+1ntwt)R
e
t+1(wt + nt
@wt
@nt
) = v0(nt)
Using the functions u(c) = c
1 
1  and v(n) =
n1+"
1+
we get:
n"t = (R
e
t+1ntwt)
 Ret+1wt(1  )
From this equation we get:
nt = (1  ) 1+" (Ret+1)
1 
+"w
1 
+"
t
Using the above rst order conditions we can derive the following equilibrium conditions.
First the budget constraint implies that
kt+1 = ntwt  mt
= (1  ) 2+"+"  Ret+1 1 +" k 1+"+"t  mt
= (1  ) 1+" (Ret+1)
1 
+" [(1  )kt ]
1+"
+"  mt (2.7)
Second, the absence of arbitrage opportunities, E(Rkt+1) = E(R
m
t+1) implies that:
1
1 + 
mt+1
mt
= k 1t+1 + 1  
ormt+1 = (1 + )mtRet+1 (2.8)
We can use these equilibrium conditions to derive steady state values for k and m in the
case where both assets coexist: Using (2.8) we have:
k
out
=

1

(
1
1 + 
  1 + )
 1
 1
and using (2.7) we have:
m = (1  ) 1+" ((kout) 1 + 1  ) 1 +" [(1  )(kout)] 1+"+" ]  (kout)
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Figure 1: Illustration of Phase Diagram for the Planar Model with Capital and Money
A phase diagram that illustrates the possible steady state values for money and capital
can be developed by plotting equations (2.7)-(2.8) Figure 1 provides an illustration.
This model with productive capital and money as means of savings has three rational
expectations equilibria. (k;m) = (0; 0), (k;m) = (kin; 0), (k;m) = (kout;mout). In Figure 1,
the autarkic equilibrium is labeled k-out, the nontrivial nonmonetary equilibrium where
capital is the only source of savings is labeled as k-inand the outside moneyequilibrium
where at money and productive capital coexist and pay the same rate of return is labeled
k-out. In this section we will consider only the latter two equilibria which are the ones of
greatest interest.
Under rational expectations the outside money equilibrium (if it exists) is a saddle path
and the inside money equilibrium is a sink. If the return on money is more than the return
on capital in the case where capital is the only medium of exchange, (that is, if the economy
is dynamically ine¢ cient) then a monetary equilibrium exists. The condition for dynamic
ine¢ ciency can be written as:
1
1 + 
> f 0(kin) + 1   (2.9)
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The left hand side is the gross steady state return on real money balances.1 The right
hand side is the gross steady state return on capital when capital is the only mean of savings.
This condition states that when the steady state return on money is greater than the steady
state return on capital in the environment where there is no money, that money can serve
as an additional store of value. Otherwise money will not be valued by agents.
2.3.2 The existence of dynamically ine¢ cient equilibrium in Diamonds over-
lapping generations model:
Unlike the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans innitely lived agent model, it is possible for competi-
tive equilibria to be dynamically ine¢ cient in Diamonds model. The capital stock of the
Diamond model may exceed the golden-rule level, so that a permanent increase in consump-
tion is possible. If individuals in the market economy want to consume in the old age, their
only choice is to hold capital, even if its rate of return is low. But a planner can divide
the resources available for consumption between the young and old in any manner. If this
change is required for every generation, a planner makes every generation better o¤. In our
model, instead of a planner, money is introduced as a mean to decrease the capital stock to
its golden rule level and eliminate the dynamic ine¢ ciency.
In order to assess the E-stability of the stationary equilibria of the model it is necessary
to linearize equations (2.7)-(2.8). This gives:
kt+1 = c
out
k + 
out
r r
e
t+1 + 
out
k kt  mt
mt+1 = c
out
m +mt + 
 
ret+1

1The gross return on real money balances is simply the inverse of the expected ination factor: ptpt+1 =
Mt+1=pt+1
(1+)Mt=pt
= 11+
mt+1
mt
.
14
where
coutk = (1  )
2+"
+" (R)
1 
+" (k
out
)
1+"
+"  m;
outr = (1  )
2+"
+"
1  
 + "
((k
out
) 1 + 1  ) 1 +" 1(kout) 1+"+" ;
outk = (1  )
2+"
+"
1 + "
 + "
((k
out
) 1 + 1  ) 1 +" (kout) 1+"+" 1;
coutm = (1 + )m((k
out
) 1 + 1  );
 = 1 + ) m:
2.3.3 Expectational Stability
We will use the rst linearized equations to analyze the expectational stability
kt+1 = c
out
k + 
out
r r
e
t+1 + 
out
k kt  mt (2.10)
mt+1 = c
out
m +mt + r
e
t+1 (2.11)
Substitute the lagged value of (2.11) into (2.10) to get
kt+1 = c
out
k + 
out
r r
e
t+1 + 
out
k kt   coutm  mt 1   rt
using rt = doutkt
kt+1 = c
out
k   coutm + outr ret+1 +
 
outk   dout

kt  mt 1
We can write the perceived law of motion equation (PLM) as
rt+1 = a+ bkt + cmt 1 + "t
The expected value of rt+1 will be a + bkt + cmt 1. Pugging this value into the linearized
equation gives the actual law of motion (ALM) equation which is:
kt+1 = c
out
k   coutm + outr a+
 
outk   dout + outr b

kt + (
out
r c  1)mt 1
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Since factors are paid their marginal product, rt+1 = k 1t+1   . Linearizing this equation
around the steady state gives
rt+1 =  (  1) (kout) 2kt+1
Or shortly,
rt+1 = d
outkt+1
where dout =  (  1) (kout) 2 Using this equality in the actual law of motion gives
rt+1 = d
out
 
coutk   coutm + outr a

+ dout
 
outk   dout + outr b

kt + d
out
 
outr c  1

mt 1
Thus, the mapping from the PLM to ALM is given by the T-map:
T
0BBB@
a
b
c
1CCCA =
0BBB@
dout
 
coutk   coutm + outr a

dout
 
outk   dout + outr b

dout(outr c  1)
1CCCA
The unique rational expectations equilibrium for this model is the unique xed point of the
T-map which is:
d
d
0BBB@
a
b
c
1CCCA = T
0BBB@
a
b
c
1CCCA 
0BBB@
a
b
c
1CCCA
where  denotes notional time. It is said that the rational expectations equilibrium is
expectationally stable, or E-stable, if the rational expectations equilibrium is locally asymp-
totically stable under the above equation.
da
d
= dout
 
coutk   coutm

+
 
doutoutr   1

a
db
d
= dout
 
outk   dout

+
 
doutoutr   1

b
dc
d
=  dout +  doutoutr   1 c
The rational expectations equilibrium is E-stable if and only if doutoutr < 1: Although there is
an explicit expression for the steady state value of capital, the value of doutoutr is dependent
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on many parameters which makes it impossible to nd an analytic solution. We therefore
conducted numerical analysis to check the plausibility of the condition that doutoutr < 1 for
a more plausible parameterization of the model. Specically, we considered the same grid
of parameter values used for the model without money and provided earlier in Table 1. In
addition, to those parameters, we now also vary the parameter  from 0 to 1:0 with step-size
0:1. The case of  = 0 represents a constant money stock, while values of  > 0 imply a
growing supply of money. We focus only on cases where the equilibrium with both money
and capital exists, i.e., the condition for dynamic ine¢ ciency (2.9) is satised.
Of all parameter combinations satisfying (2.9), we nd that doutoutr is less than 1 in
36968 cases out of 38777 cases when  is between 0.1 and 0.8. When  = 1, doutoutr is less
than 1 in 13300 cases out of 17187 cases. When we look at the cases where the system
is not stable we observe that  is always equal or greater than 0.6 and  is either 0.1 or
0.2. Even though we do not observe a clear pattern for the parameter values, our numerical
analysis suggests that higher levels of depreciation and lower levels of capital share may lead
to instability.
Thus for empirically plausible versions of the model, the dynamically ine¢ cient equilib-
rium where capital and money coexist as means of intertemporal savings is learnable, for
most of the time, by agents. As the equilibrium where only capital serves as a store of value
is also learnable, we conclude that the E-stability principle (adaptive learning dynamics)
do not enable us to select from among the nontrivial equilibria of the Diamond overlapping
generations model as both equilibria can be learned by agents who do not initially possess
rational expectations.
2.4 A MORE GENERAL CASE
2.4.1 The Model
Now we will consider the case where consumption in both periods of life is possible. In
the rst period, agents will make an additional choice between youthful consumption and
savings. The setup of this model is the same as the previous one except for the extra choice
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of consumption in the rst period.
The problem of the representative agent is:
maxu (ct) + u (ct+1)  v (nt)
subject to:
mt + kt+1  ntwt   ct
ct+1  Ret+1(mt + kt+1)
Simplifying the budget constraints gives ct+1  Ret+1(ntwt ct), So the maximization problem
becomes:
u (ct) + Etu(R
e
t+1(ntwt   ct))  v(nt)
The rst order conditions give:
 u0(ct+1)Ret+1 + u0(ct) = 0 (2.12)
u0(ct+1)Ret+1(wt + nt
@wt
@nt
) = v0(nt) (2.13)
using u0(c) = c  and v0(n) = n" (2.12) and (2.13) become
c t+1R
e
t+1 = c
 
t
c t+1R
e
t+1(wt + nt
@wt
@nt
) = n"t (2.14)
ct = (R
e
t+1)
 1=ct+1
The budget constraint is ct+1 = Rt+1(ntwt   ct)
ct+1 = Rt+1(ntwt   (Rt+1) 1 ct+1)
or
ct+1 =
Rt+1ntwt
1 + (Rt+1)
1  1

(2.15)
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Substitute (2.15) into the following equation which is equation (2.14)
n"t = (1  )wtRt+1c t+1
nt = (1  ) 1+"w
1 
+"
t g(Rt+1) (2.16)
where g(Rt+1) = R
1 
+"
t+1 [1 + (Rt+1)
1  1
 ]

+" . The market clearing condition is
kt+1 = ntwt   ct  mt
We know that ct = [(1  )wt]n
 "

t : So
kt+1 = ntwt   (1  )wt n
 "

t  mt
Using (2.16),
kt+1 = (1  )
2+"
+"k
 1+"
+"
t g(Rt+1)  (1  ) 
"
(+")
+  "

1 
+" k
(  1 
+"
"

)
t [g(Rt+1)]
 "
  mt
In short,
kt+1 = Ak
z1
t g(Rt+1) Bkz2t [g(Rt+1)]
 "
  mt
where A = (1  ) 2+"+" ; z1 =  1+"+" ; B = (1  ) 
"
(+")
+  "

1 
+" , z2 = (   1 +" " ):
Linearization gives the following equation.
kt+1 =
n
Az1k
z1 1
g(R) Bz2kz2 1[g(R)] "
o
kt:::
:::+
n
Ak
z1
g(R) +Bk
z2 "

[g(R)]
 "

 1g(R)
o
rt+1  mt + const
This equation has the same structure as the version presented in the previous section.
The expectational stability requirement for this system is for the coe¢ cient on rt+1 to be less
than 1. We used the same parameter values given in Table 1 to conduct a further numerical
analysis. With this model we observed that the inside money equilibrium together with the
outside money equilibrium are always stable. Out of 17556 monetary equilibrium where it
exits, all of them are stable. This suggests that the results that we found in the previous
model are robust to the addition of an intratemporal consumption/savings decision.
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2.5 CONCLUSION
Diamonds (1965)overlapping-generations model with productive capital and money is used
by many researchers. The question of whether the equilibria of this model are learnable by
adaptive agents who do not initially possess rational expectations has not been previously
explored. In particular, one might hope to use learning to reduce the set of rational ex-
pectations equilibria and in particular, to rule out the possibility of dynamically ine¢ cient
equilibria. Our results suggest that stability analysis under adaptive learning does not pro-
vide a means for selecting from among the multiple equilibria in this model. In particular,
we nd that dynamically ine¢ cient equilibria are learnable. While the nding that learning
does not work as a selection device in this model might be viewed as a negative result, the
nding that dynamically ine¢ cient equilibria are learnable might be viewed (positively or
negatively!) as rationalizing some kind of government intervention, e.g. at money or social
security transfer schemes that restore the economy to one of dynamic e¢ ciency.
2.6 APPENDIX
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We assume full depreciation,  = 1. together with the usual assumptions for  , " and ;
 2 (0; 1) ; ",  > 0. dininr =  (  1) (k
in
) 2(1  ) 2+"+" 1 
+"
((k
in
) 1)
1 
+"
 1(k
in
)
1+"
+"
dininr =  (  1) 1 +"(1  )
2+"
+"
1 
+"
 1(k
in
) 2+( 1)
1 
+"
 1+ 1+"
+"
Substituting the value of capital, k
in
= [(1  )2+"1 ] 11 2+ "+" we get
dininr =  (  1) 1 +"(1  )
2+"
+"
1 
+"
 1 ((1  )2+"1 )
 2+( 1) 1 +" 1+
1+"
+"
1 2+ "+"
dininr =  (  1) 1 +"(1  )
2+"
+"
1 
+"
 1

(1  ) 2+"+" 1 +"
 1
dininr =  (  1) 1 +" 1 = (1  )  1+" < 1
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3.0 TWO-SIDED LEARNING IN A NATURAL RATE MODEL
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Di¤erences in peoples perceptions play an important role in economics. Whenever we as-
sume multiple agents, the possibility for disagreement in beliefs opens up the possibility of
exploiting these di¤erences. For example, agents with di¤erent views about the structure of
the economy may derive di¤erent decision rules. Or agents may have di¤erent beliefs about
the commitment technology of the government. In this paper, we study the e¤ect of these
di¤erences in a natural rate model where the beliefs of the private sector a¤ect the ability
of the central bank to achieve its goals.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) use a natural rate model to argue that, if at each time
policymakers select the best action given the current situation, the social objective function
will typically not be maximized. Rather, they suggested that, economic performance can be
improved by committing ahead of time to policy rules. The current decisions of economic
agents depend on their expectations of future policy actions. If agents are rational and have
the same information as policy makers, they can infer the actions the government will take.
The resulting game dynamics can lead to suboptimal behavior that would not occur if the
government sets its future policy independent of what other agents do in the meantime. The
optimal policy maximizes the social objective function but it is not consistent due to the
rationality of the agents. Specically, Kydland and Prescott (1977) show that doing what is
best given the current situation i.e. a discretionary or time-consistent policy results in
an excessive level of ination without any improvement in unemployment.
Sargent (1999) studied the post World War II American ination under the assumption
that policy makers learned to believe in natural unemployment rate hypotheses during this
22
period. He relaxed the rational expectations hypothesis for the policy maker but not the
private sectorand assumed adaptive learning behavior in its place. This model exhibits
recurrent escapes from the time-consistent outcome to the optimal outcome of Kydland
and Prescott (1977). Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) showed that the escapes from the
time-consistent outcome occur via accidental experimentation induced by the governments
adaptive algorithm and its misspecied model.
Assuming the private sector has rational expectations reduces the analysis to a single-
agent decision problem. Barro and Gordon (1983) argued that this approach cannot deal
with the game-theoretic situation that arises when decisions are made on an ongoing basis.
Pursuing this idea, in this paper, neither the central bank nor the private sector know the true
model but instead build independent approximating models that incorporate separate beliefs
about how the economy works. Thus the model involves a dual-agent decision problem.
On one side, the central bank constructs a model with its own beliefs and commitment
technology. It derives a policy rule as a function of its current information set. On the other
side, the private sector constructs another model with the goal of predicting the policy of
the central bank. Its expectation of the central banks policy will be a function of its own
current information set.
In this paper the central bank chooses the rate of price ination and the private sector
determines the rate of wage ination (or the expected ination rate) in a dynamic natural
rate model. The two players can have di¤erent specications for the laws of motion of the
economy. They may also have di¤erent beliefs/knowledge about the commitment technology
of the central bank. They update their information set every period as new data is generated.
Our results are as follows: 1) When the private sector learns the economy with a correctly
specied model rather than having rational expectations, we observe the disappearance of
the escapes of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) and convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
The additional distortion from the learning model of the private sector makes it more di¢ cult
for an unusual sequence of shocks to deceive the central bank.
2) In a reverse robustness check we let the private sector have a misspecied approx-
imating model while the central bank has a correctly specied approximating model. We
observe escapes but this time the source of the uctuations is the private sector rather than
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the central bank. This establishes that escapes can occur in a more plausible environment
where the central bank is better informed than the private sector.
3) We observe that in some scenarios a di¤erence in beliefs between the central bank and
the private sector allows the central bank to exploit the private sector and achieve ination
lower than the Nash level. With this result we can explain the e¤orts of central banks to
inuence the private sectors expectations through announcements, release of more frequent
policy forecasts, and fuller statements explaining interest-rate policy.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In sections 3.2 and 3.3 the model and the
learning algorithm are introduced. In section 3.4 we review what happens when the private
sector is rational as in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002). We also show the convergence
of the ination rate to the central bank target when the central bank correctly species the
economy. In section 3.5 we analyze what happens under di¤erent scenarios of two-sided
learning. Finally in section 3.6 we talk about possibilities for further research.
3.2 THE MODEL
The model we develop is a general model that encompasses the properties of the model
used by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002). The model
describes the behavior of a central bank, which imprecisely chooses the rate of price ination
t, and the private sector, whose actions imprecisely determine the rate of wage ination wt.
The private sector sets the rate of wage ination aiming to set to equal to t. Thus wt can
also be viewed as the private sectors expectation of ination.
The expectational Phillips curve determines the unemployment rate:
Ut = U
n   (t   wt) + v1t; (3.1)
where
t = t + v2t: (3.2)
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and
wt = qt + v3t: (3.3)
Here Un is the constant natural rate of unemployment, Ut is the unemployment rate, t
is the central bank determined ination rate or money growth rate, qt is the private sector
determined rate of wage ination before its noise, and v1t, v2t and v3t are normally distributed
independent noises. The unemployment rate Ut is a convenient proxy for real activity in
the economy. The slope of the Phillips curve is taken to be unity for convenience. Using
another constant value will not change our results. In this model, surprise ination lowers
the unemployment rate but anticipated ination does not. Equation (3.2) states that the
central bank controls the money supply with some noise just as equation (3.3) states that
the private sector determines the rate of wage ination with some noise. The optimal choices
of t and qt are explained in detail below.
The central banks objective is summarized by the single-period return or payo¤ func-
tion, Zcb;t, which depends on that periods values for the unemployment rate and ination.
Following the literature we assume a simple quadratic form:
Zcb;t =  E

1
2
2t +
b
2
(Ut   (Un   ))2

(3.4)
The rst term in this objective function captures the cost of ination or, more precisely,
penalizes deviations of the ination rate t from the central banks target of zero. Direct
costs of changing prices would be a simple explanation for why ination is costly. The
nonnegative constant b is the weight that the central bank places on achieving its goal for
unemployment, relative to its goal for ination. The second term is the deviation from the
targeted unemployment rate, which is  less than the natural unemployment rate, where
 is a nonnegative constant. The natural rate of unemployment will tend to exceed the
e¢ cient level of unemployment in the presence of unemployment compensation and income
taxation. The constant  captures this possibility. The central bank maximizes the single-
period objective function (3.4) by choosing an ination rate t. The constraints on this
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maximization are explained below. The objective of the private sector is to maximize
Zps;t =  E

1
2
(t   wt)2

(3.5)
The private sector wants to set the wage ination as close as possible to the central bank
determined ination rate.
The determination of the unemployment rate can be characterized as a game between
the central bank and the private-sector. At period t, the central bank sets the ination rate,
t, with the information set It 1 and the belief set Bcb. Private-sector agents set the wage
ination, qt, with the same information set It 1, but with their own belief set Bps. We will
dene the belief sets Bcb and Bps and the information set It 1 below. We will consider cases
where they choose their variables at the same time or sequentially with the private sector
going rst. The timing of decisions plays an important role and will be explained in detail
below. It is also important to note that the belief sets of the agents are not time-dependent.
It should be stressed that in forming inationary expectations, the private-sector knows
that the choice of t will emerge from the central banks maximization function given in
equation (3.4). After the random disturbances vt = (v1t; v2t; v3t) are realized, equations (3.1)
- (3.3) determine the unemployment rate.
Information and Belief Sets
The information set It includes all the data available up to and including time t. The
data consists of all past values of the unemployment rate, ination rate and wage ination.
The information set, It, is available both to the central bank and the private sector. Moreover
the central bank and the private sector may have di¤erent beliefs about how the economy
works. Each will learn the economy separately with its own approximating model based on
its beliefs about the structure of the economy. We will talk more about the di¤erences in
the approximating models in the next section.
We also allow the two players to have di¤erent beliefs about the commitment technology
of the central bank. Commitment technology is the ability of the central bank to credibly
commit to a policy choice even if the optimal choice might be di¤erent in the following pe-
riods. Without the commitment technology the central bank makes policy under discretion.
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Thus the belief sets are dened as
Bcb;Bps = fstructure of the economy; commitment technology of the central bankg
Note that the central bank knows correctly and with certainty what its commitment tech-
nology, but the private sector may be misinformed about this.
Assuming that the central bank and the private sector have the same belief set means they
believe in the same structure of the economy and the private sector knows the commitment
technology of the central bank. For this section we assume that the central bank and the
private-sector agents have the same belief sets, Bcb  Bps. This assumption makes it possible
to assume rational expectations for the private sector. Later in the paper in section 3.5 we
will look for the implications of having di¤erent belief sets.
Expectation Formation
In the formation of expectations, qt, private-sector agents consider the central banks
maximization problem, which determines the choice of t. Suppose that, given its belief set,
the private sector perceives this process as described by a strategy function, F eps(It 1 j Bps).
Therefore inationary expectations are given by
qt = F
e
ps(It 1 j Bps) (3.6)
We also assume that the central bank understands that qt is generated from equation (3.6).
Solutions to the Model
Substituting (3.2), (3.3) and (3.6) into (3.1) yields
Ut = U
n   (t   F eps(It 1 j Bps) + v2t   v3t) + v1t (3.7)
Assuming that the policymaker knows the true model, he selects t that maximizes (3.4)
with respect to the constraints, including equation (3.7). There are two possible timing
protocols we could use, depending on the central banks commitment technology. If the
central bank cannot commit to a policy, it e¤ectively makes its choice of t after the private
sector has embedded its expectations into a particular choice of qt. Thus the central bank
can take qt as given, and maximize its objective function accordingly. Given its beliefs, the
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non-committed central bank has a strategy function that depends on its information set and
qt:
nct = F
nc
cb (It 1; qt j Bcb)
In the second case, the central bank can does commit to a particular policy before the
private sector institutionalizes its expectations. In this case, given its beliefs, the committed
central bank has a strategy function that depends only on its information set, ct = F
c
cb(It 1 j
Bcb). In the following two denitions these policies are derived.
Denition 2. Assume that the central bank is ether unwilling or unable to precommit to
a policy and selects its policy choice t after observing the private sectors expectations, qt,
given in (3.6). The solution to the problem
max
t
Zcb;t subject to (3.7)
is called the Nash outcome since the solution is the best response to private sector expecta-
tions. Following the literature we also call this the policy of a non-committed central bank.
The strategy function of the non-committed central bank is
nct = F
nc
cb (It 1; qt j Bcb) =
b
1 + b
 
F eps(It 1 j Bps) + 

(3.8)
The property E(vt j It 1) = 0 has been used in the computation of the strategy function.
A private sector with the same information and belief sets with the central bank, Bps  Bcb,
understands the optimization problem of the policymaker. In particular the private sector
understands that the actual choice, nct satises equation (3.8). Solving its maximization
problem given in (3.5) and using equation (3.8), the private sector calculates F eps(It 1 j Bps)
in equation (3.6). The private sector sets F eps(It 1 j Bps) = nct which leads to the policy
nct = b
A non-committed central bank will be tempted to exploit the expectational Phillips curve
in an e¤ort to achieve its goal of pushing unemployment below the natural rate. The private
sector understands the incentives of the central bank and knows the central bank faces this
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temptation to inate. The private sector, therefore, builds these inationary expectations
into its wage-setting decisions so that unemployment remains at its natural rate.
Alternatively, we can assume the central bank is able to precommit to a choice for t
before the private sector embeds its expectations into a particular choice of qt. This policy
can be viewed as a once-and-for-all choice of a policy rule. The central bank will then view
the condition F eps(It 1 j Bps) = t as a constraint that links its choice of t to a subsequent
choice for qt.
Denition 3. Assume that the central bank can precommit to a choice for  before the
private sector embeds its expectations into a particular choice of q. Its problem is then
max
t
Zcb;t subject to qt = t, (3.7)
and the solution thereof is called the Ramsey outcome. Following the literature we also call
this the policy of a committed central bank.
The optimal monetary policy with commitment is
ct = F
c
cb(It 1 j Bcb) = 0
When the central bank precommits to a choice for t, it recognizes that it will lose
ability it might otherwise have to surprise private-sector agents and thereby exploit the
Phillips curve. Hence, under commitment, the central bank abandons any idea of pushing
unemployment below the natural rate and, instead, focuses exclusively on achieving its goal
of zero ination.
A Ramsey outcome dominates a Nash outcome. E¤orts to exploit the Phillips curve
can lead only to a suboptimally high rate of ination, nct = b, with no decrease in the
unemployment rate.
3.3 LEARNING DYNAMICS
Now we assume that the central bank does not know (3.1) but believes that unemployment
follows the process
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Ut = tzt + "t
where  is a vector of coe¢ cients, z is a vector of regressors, and "t is a random variable
orthogonal to zt. The set of regressors will vary with the model that the central bank
estimates. We assume two possible approximating models, a fully specied model;
Ut = 0 + 1t + 2wt + "t (3.9)
and a misspecied model;
Ut = 0 + 1t + "t (3.10)
Depending on their beliefs, the central bank and the private sector use either (3.9) or (3.10)
to derive their policies. The second approximating model (3.10) is what Cho, Williams and
Sargent (2002) used to explain the uctuations in the US ination rate. The omission of
the private sectors expectation leads to a misperception of the shocks, which later leads to
transitions between the Nash and Ramsey outcomes.
We suppose the central bank estimates  by least squares regression of U on z in past
data. Each period, the central bank updates its estimate of  with the latest data and
solves its optimization problem with the updated . In the standard least squares regression
formula, the value of the coe¢ cient vector  is estimated by the formula
 =
 
TX
1
zz0
! 1 TX
1
zU
!
(3.11)
after T observations. This treats all data equally. More generally,  can instead be computed
using the formulas
t+1 = t + atR
 1
t zt (Ut   tzt) (3.12)
Rt+1 = Rt + at(ztz
0
t  Rt); (3.13)
where at is a sequence of positive real numbers and Rt is an estimate of the moment matrix
of zt: Setting at = 1=t gives back the standard least squares learning algorithm. Throughout
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this paper we will instead set at = a, employing what is known as a constant gain learning
algorithm, which puts more weight on the recent observation and less weight on past obser-
vations. Constant gain learning is necassary to obtain the endogenous transitions between
the Nash and Ramsey outcomes reported in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) and in sec-
tion (3.4.1) of this paper. One justication for this constant gain algorithm is to formalize
perpetual learning which is what we observe from policymakers.
With a constant gain algorithm the distribution of t will not converge to a degenerate
distribution since t is nonnegligibly sensitive to random shocks even asymptotically. How-
ever, t may converge to a limiting probability distribution. In the limit of small a, we can
derive the limiting distribution.
3.4 LEARNING WITH THE SAME BELIEF SETS
First we assume that the central bank and the private sector have the same belief sets,
Bps  Bcb. Later in the paper we assume the case where they have the same information
set but di¤erent belief sets. The private sector wishes to forecast the decisions of the central
bank. If they have the same information and belief sets they should nd the same optimal
behavior for the central bank. Depending on the shared belief set, there are three possible
cases. In the rst case, studied in section 3.4.1, the central bank misspecies the economy,
using the approximating model (3.10). In this approximating model the central bank ignores
the expectations of the private sector. This will be very similar to what Cho, Williams and
Sargent (2002) studied. Second, the central bank correctly incorporates the expectations
of the private sector and uses (3.9) as its approximating model. In this case there are two
possibilities. The central bank may move rst and commit to a policy, section 3.4.2. Or the
central bank may move after the private sector forms its expectations, section 3.4.3. This is
the case where the central bank has no commitment technology and it is willing to exploit
the expectations of the private sector.
The convergence analysis of least square learning depends on results from stochastic
approximation theory. We will analyze the limiting behavior of the associated di¤erential
equations of the stochastic system. Similar work is done by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and
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Woodford (1990). Further details of the convergence results of each of the following sections
are given in Appendix 3.7.
3.4.1 Misspecied Central Bank Policy Rule
This section is a reproduction of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) with some minor di¤er-
ences. Their model has an unemployment target of 0 and it has equal weight on ination
and unemployment target in the objective function. But even with these minor di¤erences
the two models produce the same outcomes. Assume that the central bank does not know
(3.1) but uses its own misspecied model
Ut = 0 + 1t + "t (3.14)
The commitment technology of the central bank is irrelevant since the central bank does not
think the private sector matters. The central bank maximizes (3.4) with respect to (3.14)
and (3.2). The resulting policy is
t =
 b1 (0   Un + )
1 + b21
(3.15)
With the misspecied model (3.14) the e¤ects of expected ination wt are absorbed into the
constant 0. Since t and qt are constant at the Nash equilibrium, the failure to include wt
as a regressor costs the central bank nothing in terms of statistical t.
With a misspecied learning model the ination rate makes recurrent cycles between the
time-consistent Nash outcome and the time-inconsistent Ramsey outcome. Figure 2 shows a
simulation of the system. In this model the central bank fails to include the private sectors
expectation into its regression equation, the misspecication. Referring to Cho, Williams
and Sargent (2002) we call the endogenous movement of the ination rate to the Ramsey
outcome an escape. Escapes occur when the algorithm is driven by an unusual sequence
of random shocks. By these particular unusual sequence of random variables, 1 in (3.15)
increases. This steepens the estimated Phillips curve which leads the central bank to lower
the ination rate. Discounting past observations helps this process along. But the system
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Figure 2: Nash Equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0.
cannot remain at the Ramsey outcome indenitely since the Ramsey outcome is not a Nash
equilibrium. Eventually the system will be drown back to the Nash equilibrium outcome.
3.4.2 A Committed Central Bank Learning the Economy with the Fully Spec-
ied Model
Learning with misspecied dynamics leads to escapes between the Nash outcome and the
Ramsey outcome. It is of interest to see if the results change if the central bank considers the
expectations of the private sector as a determinant of the unemployment rate. First let us
suppose the central bank is committed. This adds one more condition to the maximization
problem of the central bank: qt = t. The central bank will maximize (3.4) with respect to
(3.9), (3.2), (3.3) and qt = t. The resulting policy rule is
t =
 b (1 + 2) (0   Un + )
1 + b (1 + 2)
2 (3.16)
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Proposition 4. When the central bank moves before the private sector and commits to
a policy, the ination rate, t, converges to a limiting probability distribution, a normal
distribution with mean value equal to the Ramsey outcome.
For the proof of this proposition refer to Appendix 3.7. Figure 3 is a simulation of this
economy.
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Figure 3: Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0
This means that when the central bank plays the Ramsey plan every period, the ination
rate stays at the Ramsey equilibrium outcome even if this is not a Nash equilibrium outcome.
The associated di¤erential equation, derived in Appendix 3.7, has a unique steady state
with,  =

Un  1 1

. When substituted into the central banks policy function we get
the Ramsey equilibrium outcome, t = 0.
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3.4.3 A Non-Committed Central Bank Learning the Economy with the Fully
Specied Model
In the previous section, the central bank moves rst and commits to a policy. What if the
central bank moves second? First the private sector forms its expectation, wt, about the
central banks policy. Then the central bank chooses its policy, the targeted ination rate
t. Assume the central bank does not know (3.1) but uses its own model
Ut = 0 + 1t + 2wt + "t (3.17)
We call this model the fully specied model since the expectation of the private sector is not
omitted. The central bank will maximize (3.4) with respect to (3.17), (3.2) and (3.3). The
resulting policy rule is
t =
 b1(0   Un + )  b12qt
1 + b21
(3.18)
Since the private sector can forecast this decision, it will set qt = t. Then the policy rule of
the central bank reduces to
t =
 b1(0   Un + )
1 + b21 + b12
(3.19)
Proposition 5. When the central bank moves after observing the expectations of the pri-
vate sector, the ination rate, t, converges to a limiting probability distribution, a normal
distribution with mean value equal to the Nash equilibrium ination rate.
Figure 4 is a simulation of the economy. The associated di¤erential equation of this
system has a unique steady state with  =

Un  1 1

. When substituted into the
central banks policy function (3.19) we get the Nash equilibrium value, t = b. So at the
equilibrium the central bank is playing the Nash equilibrium, the value that the ination
rate is converging. This shows us the Nash equilibrium is learnable if both agents believe
the correct model specication.
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Figure 4: Nash Equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0.
3.5 TWO-SIDED LEARNING
In section 3.4 we assumed that the central bank and the private sector have the same belief
sets, Bps  Bcb. Therefore the problem was reduced to a single agent problem. Having the
same information and belief sets, the private sector is able to correctly predict, up to a noise,
what ination will be. But we know this is not always the case. In reality the central bank
and the private sector may often have di¤erent views about how the economy works. In this
section we assume the central bank and the private sector have di¤erent belief sets.
3.5.1 A Robustness Check for Endogenous Fluctuations
In Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002), and in section 3.4.1 of this paper, the central bank
learns the economy with a misspecied model, while the private sector has rational expecta-
tions. In this section we assume the private sector learns the economy with a fully specied
model. It also correctly believes that the central bank is non-committed. The private sector
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believes the structure of the economy is described by
Ut = 0 + 1t + 2wt + "t (3.20)
The vector of coe¢ cients  will be used for the private sector while  will continue to denote
the vector of coe¢ cients for the central bank. The problem the private sector thinks the
central bank is solving is
max

Zcb;t subject to (3.20), (3.2) and (3.3)
The policy function the private sector forecasts is
F eps(It 1 j Bps) =
 b1(0   Un + )  b12qt
1 + b21
(3.21)
Given the information set and the belief set, F eps(It 1 j Bps) is what the private sector thinks
the central banks policy is. So the private sector will set wage ination to
qt = F
e
ps(It 1 j Bps) =
 b1(0   Un + )
1 + b21 + b12
The central bank is the same central bank of section 3.4.1. The central bank uses the
misspecied model, Ut = 0 + 1t + "t. The policy function of the central bank is given in
(3.15).
Proposition 6. When the central bank misspecies the economy where as the private sector
learns with the fully specied model assuming a non-committed central bank, the ination
rate, t, converges to a limiting probability distribution which is normal with mean equal to
the Nash equilibrium value.
A simulation of this economy is given in gure 5, and proof of this proposition is in
Appendix 3.7. When the private sector learns the economy with a correctly specied ap-
proximating model while the central bank has a misspecied model, we observe the con-
vergence of the expectations of the private sector to the Nash equilibrium outcome and the
ination rate converges to the same mean also. This result is interesting in the sense that
the escapes between the Nash and Ramsey outcomes of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002)
disappear. If, instead of assuming rational expectations for the private sector, we equip the
private sector with a fully specied approximating model it can prevent the central bank
from misinterpreting random shocks.
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Figure 5: Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0
3.5.2 Reverse Robustness Check
In the previous section we observed the disappearance of the endogenous uctuations with
a learning private sector even if the private sector learns the rational expectations policy.
We would like to test the robustness of this result by considering the reverse case. Now a
non-committed central bank learns the economy with a fully specied approximating model
and the private sector learns the economy with a misspecied approximating model. This
is a more plausible case since the central bank should be better informed than the private
sector. The central banks policy function is given in (3.18). Given the information set and
the beliefs of the private sector, the policy function of the private sector will be similar to
(3.15) but expressed in terms of the coe¢ cient vector :
qt = F
e
ps(It 1 j Bps) =
 b1 (0   Un + )
1 + b21
(3.22)
Observing the wage ination rate the central bank determines the ination rate, up to a noise,
using the policy function (3.18). The following proposition outlines the what happens.
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Figure 6: Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0
When a non-committed central bank learns the fully specied model where as the private
sector learns the misspecied model, the ination rate, t, endogenously uctuates with
sudden escapes from the Nash equilibrium outcome. A simulation of this economy is given
in gure 6. As can be seen in this gure, the ination rate uctuates together with wage
ination. This leads to endogenous uctuations as seen in section 3.4.1. Since the central
bank follows the private sector in its policy we observe similar uctuations in the central
bank determined ination rate. This provides an alternative explanation for uctuations in
the ination rate where this time the private sector is the cause of the uctuations. But
uctuations in the ination rate are not as wide spread as they are for wage ination rate.
Since the central bank has the ability to exploit the expectations of the private sector it can
achieve better results.
Comparing with the previous case we observe the endogenous uctuations in a di¤erent
environment. This is a reproduction of the escapes in a setup where the private sector does
not have rational expectations and the central bank is better informed than the private
sector. In this scenario the cause of the escapes of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) is the
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private sector rather than the central bank. A central bank without a commitment to a
particular policy choice determines an ination rate that uctuates with the expectations of
the private sector.
3.5.3 Exploiting the Di¤erence in Beliefs
In a two-sided learning environment we allow the central bank and the private sector to
have di¤erent beliefs about the economy. Assuming a di¤erence in beliefs opens up the
possibility of exploiting these di¤erences. In a natural rate model, if the central bank can
keep the beliefs of the private sector lower than its actual policy, it may take advantage of
this di¤erence to achieve a lower than Nash equilibrium outcome level of ination. Assume
the private sector thinks the central bank is committed to a policy using a fully specied
model. The private sector solves the maximization problem of the central bank
max
t
Zcb;t subject to qt = t, Ut = 0 + 1t + 2wt + "t, (3.2) and (3.3)
The policy function of the private sector is
qt = F
e
ps(It 1 j Bps) =
 b (1 + 2) (0   Un + )
1 + b (1 + 2)
2 ; (3.23)
The private sector forms its expectations before the central bank determines the ination
rate. Observing the expected wage ination, the non-committed central bank determines
the ination rate using the policy function (3.18). The following proposition outlines the
case.
Proposition 7. When the central bank is not committed to a policy where the private sector
learns the economy assuming a committed central bank the ination rate, t, converges to a
limiting probability distribution which is normal with mean equal to a restricted perceptions
equilibrium.
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Figure 7: Nash equilibrium is 2, Ramsey is 0
A simulation of this economy is given in gure 7. The expectations of the private sector
converge to the Ramsey equilibrium outcome where as the actual ination rate converges to
higher value. This is a restricted-perceptions equilibrium, an equilibrium that arises from
the beliefs of agents rather than from the fundamentals of the model. This is an interesting
result since if the di¤erence in beliefs is maintained, the central bank attains a better result
than the Nash equilibrium outcome, with an ination rate between the Nash and the Ramsey
outcomes.
It is well known that central banks make announcements to inuence the private sector.
The private sector pays attention to these announcements and they denitely have an impor-
tant role in the formation of it expectations. According to rational expectations theory any
kind of attempt to manipulate expectations should not work and the private sector should
correctly predict the central bank determined ination rate. But in reality the central bank
does try to inuence the beliefs of the private sector by making announcements, publishing
more frequent policy forecasts and fuller statements explaining interest-rate policy are some
examples to explain how the central bank is trying to inuence the beliefs of the private
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sector to attain an advantage in determining the ination rate. In this section we have seen
these actions might work to the advantage of the central bank.
3.6 CONCLUSION
Expectations play an important role in the realization of the ination rate, but di¤erent
perceptions of the world lead to di¤erent expectations and policies. Whenever we consider
models with multiple agents it is important to consider the implications of such di¤erences.
In this paper we test some previous results in the learning literature in a two-sided learning
environment where two agents construct models and decision rules independently.
In his famous book "Conquest of American Ination" Thomas Sargent analyzes the rise
and fall of U.S. ination after 1960. According to Sargent (1999) the role of expectations
in economics was not well established before the 1970s. Policymakers of the time adopted
methods derived from exploitation of the Phillips curve in the hope of lowering the ination
rate. As they learned from new data, they re-estimated their Phillips curve and adjusted their
target ination rate accordingly. But since they ignored the role of ination expectations in
the Phillips curve, uctuations in the ination rate resulted. First we show that with the
inclusion of the expectations in a one-sided learning model the policymaker can achieve the
results it targets.
In the second part of the paper we analyze the case where the central bank and the
private sector have di¤erent views of the economy and they learn the economy with their
own models. This allows us to test the robustness of the escapes of Cho, Williams and
Sargent (2002) to two-sided learning. Our results show that the endogenous uctuations
of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) are not robust to a learning private sector. Even if
the private sector learns the policy of the central bank we observe the disappearance of the
uctuations. But we show that it is possible to reproduce these endogenous uctuations
in a more plausible environment where the central bank uses a fully specied model and
the private sector uses a misspecied model, so the central bank is better informed than
the private sector. In this case the expectations of the private sector uctuate, causing the
ination rate to uctuate with it.
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In another two-sided learning environment, the actual ination rate and the expectations
of the private sector converge to di¤erent values. Given its beliefs, the private sector is not
capable of learning the policy of the central bank. The private sector updates its data set
every period but this updating does not allow it to change its model specication. This is
a weakness of the Evans-Honkapohja-Sargent learning mechanism. Since the unemployment
rate decreases as much as the decrease in the expected rate of ination, the regression co-
e¢ cients do not respond to the divergence of the actual ination rate from the expected
ination rate. The steady state that the ination rate converges to is a restricted percep-
tions equilibrium, an equilibrium that arises from the beliefs of agents rather than from the
fundamentals of the model. The existence of such a di¤erence in beliefs lets the central bank
achieve ination lower than the Nash level.
We would like to see whether this result can be obtained in a less restrictive setting
where the private sector learns via a mechanism (such as Bayesian learning) that does allow
it to update its model specication. It is known that central banks make announcements or
reveal information to a¤ect the beliefs of the private sector. Is this because they actually can
use their inuence to manipulate the private sectors beliefs and achieve better than Nash
outcome?
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3.7 PROOFS
3.7.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We consider algorithms of the form
n = n 1 + aH (n 1; Xn) (3.24)
n 2 Rd; Xn 2 Rk with a starting point for 0. Xn is the vector of state variables. H() is
the functions describing the learning rule. Here n denotes discrete time so that we can use
t below for continuous time.
We use Theorem 7.9 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Provided that the necessary
assumptions of the theorem are satised the distribution of n can be approximated, for
small a and large n, by
t v N(; aC)
where  is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the ODE d=dt = h(), h()
will be derived in a moment, and
C =
Z 1
0
esBR () esB0ds
where B = Dh(
), Rij() =
1P
k= 1
cov[Hi(;Xk);Hj(;X0 )].
We should derive the ordinary di¤erential equation d=d = h() rst. The algorithm
for updating t is
t = t 1 + aR
 1
t 1zt 1(Ut 1   t 1zt 1) (3.25)
Rt = Rt 1 + a(zt 1z0t 1  Rt 1) (3.26)
where Ut = Un  (t wt)+v1t, zt = ( 1 t wt )0 and t = ( 0t 1t 2t )0, t = t+v2t,
wt = qt + v3t, t =
 b(1+2)(0 Un+)
1+b(1+2)
2 , qt = t.
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The algorithm given in (3.25) and (3.26) is in the standard form of (3.24) when we dene
t =
 
t
vec(Rt)

and Xt =
 
zt 1
v1t

. The appropriate H function can be derived from (3.25) and
(3.26). We can rewrite the algorithm in the following form
t = t 1 + aR
 1
t 1zt 1(U
n   (t 1   wt 1) + v1t   0   1t 1   2wt 1)
Rt = Rt 1 + a(zt 1z0t 1  Rt 1)
or
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There is a unique steady state of the di¤erential equation (3.27) which
is  =

Un  1 1

. It is trivial to derive hR(;R) and its steady state. The steady
state of h() is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point since the eigenvalues of
the 6  6 matrix Dh() have strictly negative real parts. Now we need to show that the
assumptions of the theorem hold for our case.
Let D = f(;R) j  2 R3; R 2 (;1)3g for some xed arbitrarily small  > 0. Assume
that zt has support on some closed set and let mz = E(zt 1z0t 1) be PSD. The polynomial
bounds and Lipschitz conditions (A.2), (A.3) on H() and @H=@X are met for compact sets
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Q  D. Conditions (M.1)-(M.5) follow immediately from the assumptions that zt and vt are
iid exogenous processes with bounded support. From the theorem of Coddington (1961, p.
248), it follows that Dh(
) is Lipschitz on D. The eigenvalues of Dh(
) are all negative
which implies that  is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the ODE. Hence
assumptions (H.1)-(H.3) are met, the theorem applies to this case.
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 5
We should derive the ordinary di¤erential equation d=d = h() and show that the unique
steady state of this equation is globally asymptotically stable. The conditions of the theorem
are similar to the rst case.
For this case the adaptive system can be written in the form
t = t 1 + aR
 1
t 1zt 1(Ut 1   t 1zt 1)
Rt = Rt 1 + a(zt 1z0t 1  Rt 1)
where Ut = Un   (t   wt) + v1t, zt = ( 1 t wt )0 and t = ( 0t 1t 2t )0, t =
t + v2t, wt = qt + v3t, t =
 b1(0 Un+)
1+b21+b12
, qt = t.
We can write these equations as
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There is a unique steady state of this di¤erential equation which is  =

Un  1 1

.
This steady state is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point of h(;R) since the
eigenvalues of Dh(
) have strictly negative real parts.
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We will show that the equilibrium point of the ordinary di¤erential equation d=d = h()
is globally asymptotically stable. The other required conditions can be easily shown to be
satised. The central bank is using 2 parameters, the private sector is using 3 parameters.
Together with the adjustment matrices the system is represented by a 1010 matrix. The
eigenvalues of the matrix B = Dh(
) should have all negative real parts.
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t 1z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Rt = R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.
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We can write these equations as
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For the private sector:
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There is a unique steady state of this di¤erential equation,  =

Un + b  1

,  =
Un  1 1

. The eigenvalues of B = Dh(
) for this steady state are all negative.
3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 7
We will show that the equilibrium point of the ordinary di¤erential equation d=d = h()
is globally asymptotically stable. The other required conditions can be easily shown to be
satised. The central bank and the private sector are using 3 parameters. Together with the
adjustment matrices the system will be represented by a 1212 matrix. The eigenvalues of
the matrix B = Dh(
) should have all negative real parts.
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We can write these equations as
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For the private sector:
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There is a unique steady state of this di¤erential equation,  =

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
,  =
Un  1 1

. The eigenvalues of B = Dh(
) for this steady state are all negative.
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4.0 THE CENTRAL BANKSINFLUENCE ON PUBLIC EXPECTATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the expectations of the public play an important role in the determi-
nation of the ination rate. Central banks try to direct the expectations of the public by
making announcements, releasing forecasts and explaining their policies. As an example to
evidence of the Federal Reserves attention to expectations, its chairman Bernanke recently
said "Undoubtedly, the state of ination expectations greatly inuences actual ination and
thus the central banks ability to achieve price stability"1.
Understanding the relationship between policy actions and the formation of ination ex-
pectations as well as determinants of the publics expectations of ination is very important
in monetary policy. This understanding may allow us to manipulate the public sectors ina-
tion expectations to achieve better results which will be in the interest of any central bank.
Besides open market operations, the central banks also engage in "open mouth operations".
Public speeches, release of private information or reactions to unexpected market outcomes
can be a considered as a way to inuence ination expectations with open mouth operations.
So, do the expectations of the public follow the designation of the central bank? Probably
"no". But then do these announcements have a point? Probably "yes".
In this paper we study the planned announcements of a central bank that tries to inuence
the public. This work is in parallel with the reform the FOMC is going through after the
appointment of Mr. Bernanke which includes publishing more frequent policy forecasts and
1Ination Expectations and Ination Forecasting, at the Monetary Economics Workshop of the National
Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts July 10, 2007
54
fuller statements explaining interest-rate policy.2
The paper is about central bank policies and announcements. It is known that the
realization of the ination rate depends on the expected value of ination. By making
regular announcements the central bank tries to inuence the private sector to achieve better
outcomes from its monetary policy.
New Keynesian models have been used extensively in the recent literature on monetary
policy. These give rise to a Taylor-rule of optimal policy for the central bank under rational
expectations3. Another positive side of this model is the central bank sets the nominal
interest rate rather than the money supply which makes it more realistic than models with
money supply setting. In this model, with rational expectations, announcements can have
no e¤ect on private sector expectations and add no information so they are e¤ectively cheap
talk. But assuming rational expectations for the private sector is a very strong assumption.
Instead of assuming rational expectations for the private sector, alternatively, the private
sector may learn the economy using a recursive least square type of learning (Berardi and
Du¤y (2007) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006)).
In this paper we include an announcement e¤ect in the private sectors specication of
the structural equation for the economy. Announcements do not matter, but the private
sector does no know this, at least to begin with. The question is will they learn that
announcements do not matter. If they do not learn the truth about announcements, this
opens up the possibility of inuencing private-sector expectations to achieve better results.
Previously Karaman (2007) or Berardi and Du¤y (2007) considered models with the
private sector learning a misspecied model that omits important factors. Here we consider
what happens if the private sector includes an extanous factor in its specication. This
specication of the economy is not a misspecication with an omission of some variables but
a misspecication with an addition of an extranous variable.
In this paper we tweak the New Keynesian model to include another instrument, an
announcement, to the central bank. With having this additional instrument the central
bank has a role in open mouth operations besides its role in the open market operations.
2The Economist, March 23, 2006 "Bernanke ponders his course"
3See, e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) or Woodford (2003) for a complete exposition of this model
and its micro-founded derivations.
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With an additional instruments we expect the central bank to achieve better results. In this
model the central bank rst makes its announcement. Then the private sector observes these
announcements and builds its expectations conditioning on the announcement. And nally,
if the central bank has the discretion to do so, it revises its policy.
One important aspect of the model we used is the policy function of the central bank is
a function of the private-sector expectations, unlike Walsh (1998). To analyze the e¤ects of
announcements Walsh (1998) linearizes the objective in the output gap to be able to derive
a policy function free of private sector expectations. But in the model we use the policy of
the central bank is still a function of the private sector expectations which is a more realistic
assumption.
We would like to see how the central banks announcements, which are essentially cheap
talk, are taken by the private sector. Can the central bank manipulate the expectations
of the private sector? Or equivalently, does the central bank have any credibility with the
public? And will this change over time as the private sector learns about the economy?
4.2 MODEL
We rst present the model and its solutions under two separate commitment technologies.
Then we show the e¤ects of the announcements on ination expectations. The model is a
New Keynesian model4,
yt = bEyt+1   rt   bEt+1+ gt (4.1)
t = yt +  bEt+1 + ut (4.2)
vt = (gt; ut)
0 = Fvt 1 + t
4We use a New Keynesian model where the realization of the state variables are dependant on ination and
output expectations. The model is developed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) as a science of monetary
policy. But most of the papers that work on transparency and credibility avoid this paper and use variants of
the model of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). One reason why this model was avoided is the choice variable
of the central bank (or the policy maker) is di¤erent than the variable which the expectations is taken. This
brings some complications but with a new approach, we try to overcome this complication.
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where F =
24  0
0 
35 ; t = (gt ; ut )0. t denotes the ination rate, yt the output level and
bE is the private sectors expected ination rate based on the previous periods information.bE does not necessarily represent rational expectations. yt is the output gap.  is the
discount factor. We assume that  2 (0; 1),  > 0 and  > 0. The variables gt and ut
represent demand and supply shocks respectively and it is assumed that jj, jj 2 [0; 1), and
it  i:i:d:(0; 2i ), for i = g; u.
The objective of the central bank (CB) is to minimize its loss function
minE0
1X
t=0
tLt (4.3)
where
Lt = (t   )2 +  (yt   y)2
4.2.1 Optimal Policy Under Discretion
We rst consider the case where the CB cannot credibly manipulate beliefs in the absence
of commitment. The CB takes private sector (PS) expectations as given in solving the
optimization problem. Each period the CB chooses y and  to minimize
Ft = minfyt;tg
(t   )2 +  (yt   y)2 + bEFt+1
subject to
t = yt +  bEt+1 + ut
taking as given bEFt+1, bEt+1and ut. Under discretion, future ination and output are not
a¤ected by todays actions, and the CB cannot directly manipulate expectations. The rst
order condition from this minimization is
 (t   ) +  (yt   y) = 0 (4.4)
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Using the optimality condition (4.4) in (4.2) we obtain a rst order expectational di¤erence
equation for t
t =
 (y + )
+ 2
+

+ 2
bEt+1 + 
+ 2
ut (4.5)
Using equations (4.4) and (4.5) we can obtain an expression for yt:
yt = 1   2bEt+1   3ut (4.6)
where 1 =
y+
+2
; 2 =

+2
and 3 = +2
Finally, combining (4.6) and (4.1) we obtain the optimal interest rate target rule of the
central bank:
rt =   y + 

 
+ 2
 + 

 
+ 2
 + 1! bEt+1 + 1

bEyt+1 + 1

gt +


 
+ 2
ut (4.7)
Using equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.7) we can write this system in a matrix form as:
xt = A+BbExt+1 +Dut (4.8)
where xt = (t; yt)0, A =
0@ 1
1
1A ; B =
0@    2 0
 2 0
1A ; D =
0@  13
 3
1A
The steady state of the model under discretion is
ss =
1
1 +2 yss = 1   121 +2
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4.2.2 Optimal Policy Under Commitment
We now consider the case where the central bank can credibly commit to future policies.
Thus, private sector expectations are not taken as given but are instead considered as vari-
ables that can be inuenced to achieve policy objectives. Optimal monetary policy in this
commitment case amounts to minimization of (4.3) subject to (4.2) holding in every period.
The rst order conditions from this minimization problem can be rearranged to yield
 (t   ) +  (yt   yt 1) = 0 (4.9)
From (4.2) and (4.9) we get
yt =

+ 2

 +


yt 1    bEt+1   ut
which combined with (4.1) gives the policy rule
rt =   

 
+ 2
  

 
+ 2
yt 1+ 

 
+ 2
 + 1! bEt+1+ 1

bEyt+1+ 1

gt+


 
+ 2
ut
(4.10)
Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.10) represent the economic system under commitment,
given private sector expectations. We can rewrite this system in matrix form
xt = A+BbExt+1 + Cxt 1 +Dut (4.11)
where xt = (t; yt)0 and A =
0@ 2+2

+2
1A ; B =
0@ +2 0
 
+2
0
1A ; C =
0@ 0 +2
0 
+2
1A ; D =0@ +2
 
+2
1A
The steady state values for ination and output are ss = , yss =
1 

 respectively.
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4.2.3 Stages of the Game
In this model, in addition to its policy, rt, the CB has another instrument, an announce-
ment, it+1, which can be used to inuence the private sectors formation of bEt+1. These
announcements can be in the form of a speech, release of forecasts or any communication
and need not correspond to any actual economic variable.
First the CB makes its announcement, it+1. The CB makes this announcement every
period. As derived later in the paper the announcement will be a function of some constants,
the supply shock and part of PS expectations. The PS in this model does not have rational
expectations but uses a simple learning model which structurally includes the announcments.
It is known that the PS pays attention to the announcements. E¤ective or not, we assume
that the PS considers the announcements by including them in its learning model. The CB
is aware of the fact that the PS conditions on its announcement and therefore optimizes for
the best announcement it can make5. Second, observing it+1, the PS builds their ination
expectations, bEt+1, conditional on the announcement of the CB. And third, observing the
expected rate of ination, the CB makes a policy. The policy of the CB will depend on the
commitment technology it has. Depending on this, it will either make its policy with (4.7)
or with (4.10).
4.3 DYNAMICS
4.3.1 Expectational Stability
In this model the realization of the state variables depend on the expected future value
of those variables. This means that we need to dene how the expected value of these
variables are determined. The strongest possible assumption, rational expectations, may not
be reasonable for a dynamic world. We frequently observe shocks or sometimes structural
changes which prevent agents from predicting the true ination rate. A weaker assumption
is to use learning models to see if agents can learn the rational expectations equilibrium over
time. In the context of Evans and Honkapohja (2003) agents do not know the true parameters
5We also consider a case where the CB is using an ad-hoc rule for the announcement.
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of the structural model but try to deduce them via regressions of past data. The current
iteration of the regression is used to make decisions in each period. Next period when new
information (data) is available to agents, they take another regression. If the model converges
to the rational expectations equilibrium, the equilibrium is said to be e-stable (Evans and
Honkapohja (2001)).
4.3.1.1 Stability Under Discretion It is known that (Evans and Honkapohja (2003)
and Berardi and Du¤y (2006)) the rational expectations equilibria of this model is deter-
minate and expectationally stable if both eigenvalues of B lie inside the unit circle. The
perceived law of motion used in their model is
bEt+1 = 0 + 1utbEyt+1 = y0 + y1ut
This is the minimal state variable (MSV) solution, following McCallum, the solution
with the minimum number of variables.
Now consider the case where the PS learns the economy and it is potentially inuenced by
the announcements of the CB. The innovation of this paper is to add a extraneous instrument
to the model and see if the CB can use this to inuence the PS to achieve better results.
Every period the CB makes an announcement, it+1, that inuences the PSs expectation
of the next periods ination rate. The PS thinks that the announcement is only e¤ecting
the ination rate (The formation of the expected value of output does not depend on the
announcement). Assume that the agents do not know (4.8) but believe
bExt+1 =  0 +  1ut +  2it+1 (4.12)
where bExt+1 = (bEt+1; bEyt+1)0,  0 =  0y0,  1 =  1y1 and  2 =  20  are the coe¢ cient
matrices to estimate. The announcement it+1 can be a constant or a function of the supply
shock ut. Assume that it+1 is in the form
it+1 = !0 + !1ut + vt (4.13)
61
where vt+1 = vt + nt, nt  N (0; 2n). The variable vt in the announcement is a noise in the
reception of the announcement by the PS. It is always possible to have misunderstandings
or misinterpretations in the talk of the central banks. So the CB is choosing !0 and !1 but
the realization of the e¤ective announcement is dependent on the announcement noise, vt.
We will consider di¤erent ways of choosing !0 and !1 but we will keep the functional form
of the announcement it+1 the same. There are a couple of reasons for this. First of all when
the CB optimizes for the best it+1, this optimization will be explained later, it derives the
announcement in this functional form. Besides this, with this functional form the perceived
law of motion reduces to the MSV solution which is desirable in the learning literature.
Substituted into (4.12) and (4.8) we get
xt = A+B 0 +B 2!0 + (B 1 +B 2!1 +D)ut +B 2vt
We iterate this one period forward and then apply the expectation operator to get the actual
law of motion
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 2!0 + (B 1 +B 2!1 +D) ut +B 2vt (4.14)
The T-map is from (4.12) to (4.14). The announcement it+1 in (4.12) can be a constant
or a function of ut. In the rst case the e-stability condition of the system doesnt change
where in the later case it may change. The steady state of this system is derived in appendix
4.6.1.
4.3.1.2 Stability Under Commitment The e-stability of the policy under commit-
ment is shown by Evans and Honkapohja (2006). The private sector uses laws of motion for
ination and output that are specied as
t = 

0 + 

1ut + 

2yt 1
yt = 
y
0 + 
y
1ut + 
y
2yt 1
or in a compact form
xt =  0 +  1ut +  2yt 1
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We assume that the learning equation of the PS is
bExt+1 =  0 +  1ut +  2xt 1 +  3it+16 (4.15)
where it+1 is the announcement of the CB and  0,  1 : 21,  2 =
0@ 0 2
0 y2
1A,  3 =
0@ 3
0
1A.
This form is in the MSV form if the announcement is in the following form
it+1 = !0 + !1ut + !2yt 1 + vt (4.16)
We included the lagged value of the output for the announcement under commitment. Again
this functional form of the announcement under commitment is derived in the optimization
of the CB. Please see appendix 4.6.3 for this derivation.
Substitute (4.16) into (4.15) to get the PLM
bExt+1 =  0 +  3!0 + ( 1 +  3!1)ut + Lxt 1 +  3vt (4.17)
where Lxt 1 =  3!2yt 1 +  2xt 1. Therefore L is a two by two matrix. Substitute (4.17)
into (4.11) to get
xt = A+B [ 0 +  3!0 + ( 1 +  3!1)ut + Lxt 1 +  3vt] + Cxt 1 +Dut
xt = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (B 1 +B 3!1 +D)ut + (BL+ C)xt 1 +B 3vt
Iterate one period forward and take the expectation to get
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (B 1 +B 3!1 +D) ut + (BL+ C)xt +B 3vt
Substitute (4.11) and (4.17) into the previous equation to get
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (B 1 +B 3!1 +D) ut
+(BL+ C)

A+BbExt+1 + Cxt 1 +Dut+B 3vt
6There is a di¤erence in which variable is learned, xt+1 or bExt+1. But our results do not change with
whichever is used.
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bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (BL+ C)A
+ [(B 1 +B 3!1 +D) + (BL+ C)D]ut
+(BL+ C)Cxt 1 + (BL+ C)BbExt+1 +B 3vt
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (BL+ C)A
+ [(B 1 +B 3!1 +D) + (BL+ C)D]ut
+(BL+ C)Cxt 1
+(BL+ C)B [ 0 +  3!0 + ( 1 +  3!1)ut + Lxt 1 +  3vt] +B 3vt
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (BL+ C)A+ (BL+ C)B 0 + (BL+ C)B 3!0
+ [(B 1 +B 3!1 +D) + (BL+ C)D + (BL+ C)B ( 1 +  3!1)]ut
+ [(BL+ C)C + (BL+ C)BL]xt 1
+ [(BL+ C)B 3 +B 3] vt
The last equation is the ALM. The steady states of this system is derived in appendix 4.6.2.
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4.4 DETERMINATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, IT+1
At the beginning of the period the CB makes its announcement. We only consider announce-
ments in the form of (4.13). With this functional form the CB is choosing a pair of values
for !0 and !1. After this choice vt is realized and the PS observes it+1. We present a few
di¤erent ways of making the announcement. First we consider the case where the CB is
using an ad-hoc rule to choose the announcement. Even though the rule is xed, it is a
function of the supply shock. Then we consider the cases where the CB optimizes for the
best possible announcement. In the rst optimized case the CB has full knowledge of how
the PS forms its expectations. The PS is learning the expected rate of ination using (4.12).
So full information corresponds to knowing all   values of this learning equation. In the
following case the CB does not know how much its announcements will be weighted by the
PS, or does not know the coe¢ cient 2 . And in the last case the CB is using its own model to
estimate the PSs expected ination rate. In this case we use two-sided learning introduced
by Karaman (2007).
4.4.1 Ad-hoc Announcement Rule
Suppose the CB chooses an arbitrary announcement rule where !0 and !1 are just constants,
for example
it+1 = a+ but
With this rule the CB aims to o¤set the e¤ects of the supply shock.
For the simulations of the paper we would like to use the calibration of McCallum and
Nelson (1999).
Calibration    
McCallum and Nelson (1999) 0:99 0:164 0:3 0:5
We also assume that  = 2; y = 2;  =  = 0:35. With these parameter values the steady
state values of ination rate and output gap under discretion and under commitment are
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Figure 8: Ination rate and output gap with an ad-hoc announcement rule, it+1 = 2+ 0:9ut
Ination Output
Under Discretion 5.053 0.168
Under Commitment 2 0.067
The horizontal lines in the graphs represent the ination and output levels under discretion
and under commitment. In the output section of the graphs, the two horizontal lines almost
coincide since the output values under discretion and under commitment are very close to
each other.
As it can be seen in gure (8), the ination rate and output gave converge to their steady
state values. The coe¢ cient on the announcement, 3 , converges to 0. The agent learns to
ignore the announcements but this takes some time.
4.4.2 Optimized Announcement Rules
For the following announcement rules (next three subsections) the CB determines the an-
nouncement with an optimization. In these optimizations (in the rst stage) the CB does
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not ignore the fact that it can inuence the PS expectations. In other words, it does not take
the PS expectations as given. But in the third stage after the PS expectations are formed,
the CB takes PS expectations as given.
4.4.2.1 Full Information Case Rather than using an ad hoc rule, the CB may optimize
to get the best announcement level. This announcement is a second instrument to the CB
to achieve its ination and output goals. First with making the announcement the CB tries
to inuence the expectations of the PS. After the PS builds its expectations the CB makes
its policy. To determine the optimal announcement level at rst stage we need to work
backward from the nal stage of the game. Given the announcement level (4.13) and the
PS expectations (4.14), the CB makes its policy according to (4.7). Then the CB minimizes
the loss function (4.3) with respect to the announcement level, it+1. We assume there is no
announcement for the output gap. The minimization problem is
min
fit+1g
Lt = E

(t   )2 +  (yt   y)2
	
subject to
t   yt    bEt+1   ut = 0
yt   bEyt+1 + rt   bEt+1  gt = 0bExt+1    0    1ut    2it+1 = 0
rt   0   1bEt+1   2bEyt+1   3gt   4ut = 0
The rst order condition simplies to
   y    bEt+1   ut = 0 (4.18)
Therefore we get
it+1 =
1
2

   y   ut

  0   1ut

(4.19)
which implies !0 = 12

 y

  0

and !1 =  12

1

+ 1

. The rst order condition given
in (4.18) implies that the CB will set an announcement to achieve its ination and output
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targets,  and y. Since the supply shock and the  are available to the CB when determining
the announcement level, it is able to set bEt+1. This might look like a very strong assumption.
So we also tried some other ways of determining the announcement.
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Figure 9: Ination rate and output level with optimized announcement
Figure (9) is a simulation of the dynamics. With optimized announcements the CB is
making the necessary announcements to keep the ination rate stable around 2.5 which is
below the Nash equilibirum value but above the equilibrium value under commitment. In
this case the expected value of output converges to 2, which is the target value.
Discussion
Adding a second instrument, with the full knowledge of the formation of expected in-
ation rate, allows the CB to set the expected ination rate. This looks like a very strong
assumption. Therefore we would like to see what happens when the CB does not have full
knowledge of the PS expectation formation.
4.4.2.2 Announcement with Incomplete Information Assume that the CB is aware
of the fact that announcements matter but doesnt know to what extent they matter. In
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the previous section we assumed that the CB observes all the  values which is a strong
assumption. This time we assume that the CB believes in the following equation
bEt+1 = 0 + 1ut + cit+1 (4.20)
where c is constant. This means that the CB believes that its announcement it+1 will be
weighted by the PS but does not know the true value of this weight. The CB makes policy as
if the PS is using (4.20) when setting its expectations. But the PS is using the model given in
(4.12). This means that even if the CB announces and behaves as if its announcements will
be completely considered (the coe¢ cient of it+1 will be taken to be unity), the PS evaluates
the e¤ectiveness of these announcements by using equation (4.12). Pay attention to the
fact that the CB is using the same constant and supply shock coe¢ cients here, 0 and 

1
respectively. In the next section we will consider the case where the CB is using its own
estimates for these coe¢ cients: 0 and 

1 . Assume that the CB uses the same minimization
given above and derives (4.18). Therefore the announcement level is given by
it+1 =
1
c

   y

  0

  1
c

1

+ 1

ut
Figure (10) is a simulation of the system.
The ination rate and the output gap are converging to their Nash equilibrium values.
This means that the CB is not able inuence the PS permanently: PS learns to discount the
announcements.
4.4.2.3 Announcement with Incomplete Information, Two-Sided Learning Case
Assume that the CB uses its own model to estimate (4.20). The structure of the CBs learning
function as follows bEt+1 = 0 + 1ut + cit+1
Instead of using the estimates of the PS, the CB is using its own learning model. We
use the letter  for the CBs estimate. Together with (4.18) the CB derives the following
announcement
it+1 =
1
c

   y

  0

  1
c

1

+ 1

ut
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Figure 10: The ination rate and output gap when the CB has credibility concerns
We observe convergence to the discretion equilibrium. Again the CB is not able to
inuence the PS permanently. The next proposition is the summary of the rst section.
Proposition 8. The central bank cannot inuence the private sector ination expectations
to achieve lower than Nash equilibrium level of ination rate and output gap unless it has the
full knowledge of formation of the private sector ination expectations. Using an extraneous
instrument in addition to its policy instrument does not help the central bank to achieve
better results.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Expectations of future variables are very important when making monetary policy. This
is the most important reason why Economics is not simply a eld of engineering. You
cannot engineer the economy as you engineer a building or an electrical circuit, for they
are governed by known deterministic laws. Economics deals with human behavior, which
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Figure 11: The ination rate and the output gap when there is 2-sided learning
is often compared with chaotic behavior. That is why considering ination expectations is
very important. In this paper we explore di¤erent ways of inuencing people.
In this paper we show that it is not possible to inuence the people unless you have
perfect knowledge of their behavior. But even if you do not have that perfect knowledge,
which method you use matters in terms of speed of convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
We would like to extend this work by using a Kalman lter to determine the expected
ination. There has been much work on central bank policies and for sure there will be much
more coming. The way monetary policy is made is much di¤erent than how it was made 30
years ago and it will be di¤erent 30 years from now too.
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4.6 STEADY STATES
4.6.1 Steady States of the Discretion Case
The T-map is from (4.12) to (4.14). Assume that the announcement is made in the form
(4.13). With this announcement the perceived law of motion becomes to
bExt+1 =  0 +  2!0 + ( 1 +  2!1)ut +  2vt (4.21)
From the T-map we get the following equalities.
0 + 

2!0 = 1 + (   2) (0 + 2!0)
y0 = 1   2 (0 + 2!0)
1 + 

2!1 =
 
(   2) (1 + 2!1) +  13


y1 = ( 2 (1 + 2!1)  3) 
2 = (   2) 2
From the fth equation we get 2 = 0 which implies
0 =
1
1   + 2
1 =
 13
1   (   2)
These steady state values are no di¤erent than case with no announcement.
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4.6.2 The Steady State Under Commitment
xt = A+BbExt+1 + Cxt 1 +Dut (4.22)
where xt = (t; yt)0 and A =
0@ 2+2

+2
1A ; B =
0@ +2 0
 
+2
0
1A ; C =
0@ 0 +2
0 
+2
1A ; D =0@ +2
 
+2
1A.
We assume that the learning equation of the PS is
bExt+1 =  0 +  1ut +  2xt 1 +  3it+1 (4.23)
where it+1 is the announcement of the CB and  0,  1 : 21,  2 =
0@ 0 2
0 y2
1A,  3 =
0@ 3
0
1A.
This form is in the MSV form if the announcement is in the following form
it+1 = !0 + !1ut + !2yt 1 + vt (4.24)
We included the lagged value of the output for the announcement under commitment.
Substitute (4.24) into (4.23) to get the PLM
bExt+1 =  0 +  3!0 + ( 1 +  3!1)ut + Lxt 1 +  3vt (4.25)
where Lxt 1 =  3!2yt 1 +  2xt 1. Therefore L is a two by two matrix. Substitute (4.25)
into (4.22) to get
xt = A+B [ 0 +  3!0 + ( 1 +  3!1)ut + Lxt 1 +  3vt] + Cxt 1 +Dut
xt = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (B 1 +B 3!1 +D)ut + (BL+ C)xt 1 +B 3vt
Iterate one period forward and take the expectation to get
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (B 1 +B 3!1 +D) ut + (BL+ C)xt +B 3vt
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Substitute (4.22) and (4.25) into the previous equation to get
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (B 1 +B 3!1 +D) ut
+(BL+ C)

A+BbExt+1 + Cxt 1 +Dut+B 3vt
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (BL+ C)A
+ [(B 1 +B 3!1 +D) + (BL+ C)D]ut
+(BL+ C)Cxt 1 + (BL+ C)BbExt+1 +B 3vt
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (BL+ C)A
+ [(B 1 +B 3!1 +D) + (BL+ C)D]ut
+(BL+ C)Cxt 1
+(BL+ C)B [ 0 +  3!0 + ( 1 +  3!1)ut + Lxt 1 +  3vt] +B 3vt
bExt+1 = A+B 0 +B 3!0 + (BL+ C)A+ (BL+ C)B 0 + (BL+ C)B 3!0
+ [(B 1 +B 3!1 +D) + (BL+ C)D + (BL+ C)B ( 1 +  3!1)]ut
+ [(BL+ C)C + (BL+ C)BL]xt 1
+ [(BL+ C)B 3 +B 3] vt
The last equation is the ALM. For a better reading we write it again in the following form
bExt+1 = A+ (BL+ C)A+B ( 0 +  3!0) + (BL+ C)B ( 0 +  3!0)
+ [(B ( 1 +  3!1) +D) + (BL+ C)D + (BL+ C)B ( 1 +  3!1)]ut
+(BL+ C) (BL+ C)xt 1
+ [(BL+ C)B 3 +B 3] vt
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The steady states can found from the following equalities
 0 +  3!0 = A+ (BL+ C)A+B ( 0 +  3!0) + (BL+ C)B ( 0 +  3!0)
 1 +  3!1 = (B ( 1 +  3!1) +D) + (BL+ C)D + (BL+ C)B ( 1 +  3!1)
L = (BL+ C) (BL+ C)
 3 = (BL+ C)B 3 +B 3
The last equation implies 3 = 0. Then we get the value of 

2 and 
y
2 from the third
equation, 1 and 
y
1 from the second equation, 

0 and 
y
0 from the rst equation.
4.6.3 Determination of the Announcement Under Commitment
min
fit+1g
Lt = E

(t   )2 +  (yt   y)2 +  (t+1   )2 +  (yt+1   y)2
	
subject to
t = yt +  bEt+1 + ut
yt = bEyt+1   rt + bEt+1 + gt
t+1 = yt+1 +  bEt+2 + ut+1
yt+1 = bEyt+2   rt+1 + bEt+2 + gt+1
rt = 0 + 1yt 1 + 2bEt+1 + 3bEyt+1 + 4gt + 5ut
rt+1 = 0 + 1yt + 2bEt+2 + 3bEyt+2 + 4gt+1 + 5ut+1bExt+1 =  0 +  1ut +  2xt 1 +  3it+1
where 0 =
 
(+2)
, 1 =
 
(+2)
, 2 =

(+2)
+ 1, 3 =
1

, 4 =
1

, 5 =

(+2)
,  0,
 1 : 2 1,  2 =
0@ 0 2
0 y2
1A,  3 =
0@ 3
0
1A
The rst order condition of this minimization is
(t   ) @t
@it+1
+ (yt   y) @yt
@it+1
+ (t+1   ) @t+1
@it+1
+ (yt+1   y)@yt+1
@it+1
= 0
@yt
@it+1
=   @rt
@it+1
+ 3 =  &23 + 3 = 3 (1  &2)
@t
@it+1
=  @yt
@it+1
+ 3 = 

3 (1  &2) + 3
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@yt+1
@it+1
=  @rt+1
@it+1
=  &1 @yt@it+1 =  
2&1

3 (1  &2)
@t+1
@it+1
= @yt+1
@it+1
=  2&13 (1  &2)
1  &2 =  (+2) ,  (1  &2) =
 
+2
 (1  &2) +  =  2+2 +  = +2
 2&1 (1  &2) =  2  (+2)
 
(+2)
=  
(+2)
2
 2&1 (1  &2) =  2  (+2)
 
(+2)
=  
2
(+2)
2
The FOC can be rewritten in the following form
(t   ) 
+ 2
+ (yt   y)  
+ 2
+ (t+1   )  
22 
+ 2
2 + (yt+1   y)  22 
+ 2
2 = 0
t    + (yt   y) ( ) + (t+1   )  
2
+ 2
+ (yt+1   y)  
+ 2
= 0
t+1 = yt+1 +  bEt+2
t    + (yt   y) ( ) +

yt+1 +  bEt+2     2
+ 2
+ (yt+1   y)  
+ 2
= 0
t      yt + y +  
3
+ 2
yt+1 +
 22
+ 2
bEt+2 + 2
+ 2
 +
 
+ 2
yt+1 +

+ 2
y = 0
t +

2
+ 2
  1

   yt +


+ 2
+ 1

y +
 
+ 2
  
+ 2
yt+1 +
 22
+ 2
bEt+2 = 0
t +

2
+ 2
  1

 +


+ 2
+ 1

y   yt   yt+1 +  
22
+ 2
bEt+2 = 0
yt+1 = bEyt+2   rt+1 + bEt+2
t +

2
+ 2
  1

 +


+ 2
+ 1

y   yt   
bEyt+2   rt+1 + bEt+2 ::
::+
 22
+ 2
bEt+2 = 0
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t +

2
+ 2
  1

 +


+ 2
+ 1

y   yt   bEyt+2 + rt+1::
:: 

+
22
+ 2
 bEt+2 = 0
rt+1 = 0 + 1yt + 2bEt+2 + 3bEyt+2
t +

2
+ 2
  1

 +


+ 2
+ 1

y   yt   bEyt+2 :::
+

0 + 1yt + 2bEt+2 + 3bEyt+2  + 22
+ 2
 bEt+2 = 0
t +

2
+ 2
  1

 +


+ 2
+ 1

y + 0 + (1   1)yt :::
+(3   1) bEyt+2 + 2     22
+ 2
 bEt+2 = 0
0 =
 
(+2)
, 1 =
 
(+2)
, 2 =

(+2)
+ 1, 3 =
1

, 4 =
1

, 5 =

(+2)
t +

2
+ 2
  1

 +


+ 2
+ 1

y +
 2
+ 2
+
  
+ 2
  1

yt :::
+


1

  1

bEyt+2 +  (2   1)  
+ 2

bEt+2 = 0
t    +


+ 2
+ 1

y +
  
+ 2
  1

yt = 0
t = yt +  bEt+1 + ut
yt +  bEt+1 + ut    +  
+ 2
+ 1

y +
  
+ 2
  1

yt = 0


+ 2
+ 1

y    +  
+ 2
yt +  bEt+1 + ut = 0
yt = bEyt+1   rt + bEt+1 + gt
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

+ 2
+ 1

y    +  
+ 2
bEyt+1   rt + bEt+1 + gt+  bEt+1 + ut = 0


+ 2
+ 1

y +  
+ 2
bEyt+1+ 
+ 2
rt+
 
+ 2
bEt+1+  
+ 2
gt+ bEt+1+ut = 0


+ 2
+ 1

y + 
+ 2
rt+

   
+ 2
 bEt+1+  
+ 2
bEyt+1+  
+ 2
gt+ut = 0
rt = 0 + 1yt 1 + 2bEt+1 + 3bEyt+1 + 4gt + 5ut


+ 2
+ 1

y    + 
+ 2

0 + 1yt 1 + 2bEt+1 + 3bEyt+1 + 4gt + 5ut :::
+

   
+ 2
 bEt+1 +  
+ 2
bEyt+1 +  
+ 2
gt + ut = 0


+ 2
+ 1

y    + 
+ 2
0 +

+ 2
1yt 1 +

+ 2
2bEt+1 + 
+ 2
3bEyt+1 :::
+

+ 2
4gt +

+ 2
5ut +

   
+ 2
 bEt+1 +  
+ 2
bEyt+1 +  
+ 2
gt + ut = 0
0 =
 
(+2)
, 1 =
 
(+2)
, 2 =

(+2)
+ 1, 3 =
1

, 4 =
1

, 5 =

(+2)


+ 2
+ 1

y +
 

+ 2
 

 
+ 2
   1! + 
+ 2
 

 
+ 2
yt 1 :::
+
 
1 +

+ 2


 
+ 2
!ut +  + 
+ 2
(2   1)
 bEt+1 = 0

+2
(2   1) = +2 (+2) =
22
(+2)
2
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

+ 2
+ 1

y +
 
 2 
+ 2
2   1
!
 +
 2 
+ 2
2yt 1 :::
+
 
1 +
2 
+ 2
2
!
ut +
 
 +
22 
+ 2
2
! bEt+1 = 0

 + + 2
+ 2

y +
 
 2    + 22 
+ 2
2
!
 +
 2 
+ 2
2yt 1 :::
+
  
+ 2
2
+ 2 
+ 2
2
!
ut +
  
+ 2
2
+ 2 
+ 2
2
!
 bEt+1 = 0
 
 + + 2

y +
 
 2    + 22
+ 2
!
 +
 2
+ 2
yt 1 :::
+
  
+ 2
2
+ 2
+ 2
!
ut +
  
+ 2
2
+ 2
+ 2
!
 bEt+1 = 0
Lets rewrite the previous equation like
 0y +  1 +  2yt 1 +  3ut +  4bEt+1 = 0
where  0 =
 
 + + 2

,  1 =

 2 (+2)2
+2

,  2 =
 2
+2
,  3 =

(+2)
2
+2
+2

,
 4 =

(+2)
2
+2
+2

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5.0 CONCLUSION
Diamonds (1965)overlapping-generations model with productive capital and money is used
by many researchers. The question of whether the equilibria of this model are learnable by
adaptive agents who do not initially possess rational expectations has not been previously
explored. In particular, one might hope to use learning to reduce the set of rational ex-
pectations equilibria and in particular, to rule out the possibility of dynamically ine¢ cient
equilibria. Our results suggest that stability analysis under adaptive learning does not pro-
vide a means for selecting from among the multiple equilibria in this model. In particular,
we nd that dynamically ine¢ cient equilibria are learnable. While the nding that learning
does not work as a selection device in this model might be viewed as a negative result, the
nding that dynamically ine¢ cient equilibria are learnable might be viewed (positively or
negatively!) as rationalizing some kind of government intervention, e.g. at money or social
security transfer schemes that restore the economy to one of dynamic e¢ ciency.
Expectations play an important role in the realization of the ination rate, but di¤erent
perceptions of the world lead to di¤erent expectations and policies. Whenever we consider
models with multiple agents it is important to consider the implications of such di¤erences.
In this paper we test some previous results in the learning literature in a two-sided learning
environment where two agents construct models and decision rules independently.
In his famous book "Conquest of American Ination" Thomas Sargent analyzes the rise
and fall of U.S. ination after 1960. According to Sargent (1999) the role of expectations
in economics was not well established before the 1970s. Policymakers of the time adopted
methods derived from exploitation of the Phillips curve in the hope of lowering the ination
rate. As they learned from new data, they re-estimated their Phillips curve and adjusted their
target ination rate accordingly. But since they ignored the role of ination expectations in
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the Phillips curve, uctuations in the ination rate resulted. First we show that with the
inclusion of the expectations in a one-sided learning model the policymaker can achieve the
results it targets.
In the second part of the paper we analyze the case where the central bank and the
private sector have di¤erent views of the economy and they learn the economy with their
own models. This allows us to test the robustness of the escapes of Cho, Williams and
Sargent (2002) to two-sided learning. Our results show that the endogenous uctuations
of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) are not robust to a learning private sector. Even if
the private sector learns the policy of the central bank we observe the disappearance of the
uctuations. But we show that it is possible to reproduce these endogenous uctuations
in a more plausible environment where the central bank uses a fully specied model and
the private sector uses a misspecied model, so the central bank is better informed than
the private sector. In this case the expectations of the private sector uctuate, causing the
ination rate to uctuate with it.
In another two-sided learning environment, the actual ination rate and the expectations
of the private sector converge to di¤erent values. Given its beliefs, the private sector is not
capable of learning the policy of the central bank. The private sector updates its data set
every period but this updating does not allow it to change its model specication. This is
a weakness of the Evans-Honkapohja-Sargent learning mechanism. Since the unemployment
rate decreases as much as the decrease in the expected rate of ination, the regression co-
e¢ cients do not respond to the divergence of the actual ination rate from the expected
ination rate. The steady state that the ination rate converges to is a restricted percep-
tions equilibrium, an equilibrium that arises from the beliefs of agents rather than from the
fundamentals of the model. The existence of such a di¤erence in beliefs lets the central bank
achieve ination lower than the Nash level.
We would like to see whether this result can be obtained in a less restrictive setting
where the private sector learns via a mechanism (such as Bayesian learning) that does allow
it to update its model specication. It is known that central banks make announcements or
reveal information to a¤ect the beliefs of the private sector. Is this because they actually can
use their inuence to manipulate the private sectors beliefs and achieve better than Nash
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outcome?
Expectations of future variables are very important when making monetary policy. This
is the most important reason why Economics is not simply a eld of engineering. You
cannot engineer the economy as you engineer a building or an electrical circuit, for they
are governed by known deterministic laws. Economics deals with human behavior, which
is often compared with chaotic behavior. That is why considering ination expectations is
very important. In this paper we explore di¤erent ways of inuencing people.
In this paper we show that it is not possible to inuence the people unless you have
perfect knowledge of their behavior. But even if you do not have that perfect knowledge,
which method you use matters in terms of speed of convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
We would like to extend this work by using a Kalman lter to determine the expected
ination. There has been much work on central bank policies and for sure there will be much
more coming. The way monetary policy is made is much di¤erent than how it was made 30
years ago and it will be di¤erent 30 years from now too.
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